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Getting the Carry Trade’s Jackpot: 





This Working Project studies five portfolios of currency carry trades formed with the 
G10 currencies. Performance varies among strategies and the most basic one presents 
the worst results. I also study the equity and Pure FX risk factors which can explain the 
portfolios’ returns. Equity factors do not explain these returns while the Pure FX do for 
some of the strategies. Downside risk measures indicate the importance of using regime 
indicators to avoid losses. I conclude that although using VAR and threshold regression 
models with a variety of regime indicators do not allow the perception of different 
regimes, with a defined exogenous threshold on real exchange rates, an indicator of 
liquidity and the volatilities of the spot exchange rates it is possible to increase the 
average returns and reduce drawdowns of the carry trades. 




This Working Project explores several questions related to the currency carry trade 
arbitrage strategy. Firstly, it is studied whether the strategy is profitable or not, 
especially, after the event of the 2008’s global financial crisis. In order to do this, five 
portfolios of the G10 currencies with different weighting strategies used among 
literature and by practitioners are investigated. Secondly, the latest literature emphasizes 
the tail and downside risks intrinsic to the strategy and, thus, several measures of 
downside risk and, specifically, a drawdown analysis is performed. At last, the final 
purpose of this work is answering to the following two questions: are there any regime 
indicator variables that allow to consistently predict a drawdown on the strategy?  How 
can an investor use these regime indicators to improve his final payoff? 
To begin with, in financial terms an asset’s “carry” is equal to the returns (positive 
carry) or the costs (negative) of holding such asset, assuming its price does not change. 
In that sense, it is possible to break down a security’s return into three components: the 
carry, its expected and unexpected price appreciation.
1
 Moreover, when “carry trade” is 
mentioned one is referring to a strategy composed by two or more offsetting positions 
on an asset’s class, where some securities are returning a positive cash-flow while 
others constitute a liability. This strategy can be exploited over a variety of classes such 
as global equities and bonds, Treasuries, index options, currencies and commodities. 
Nevertheless, its most widespread application is on currencies, which is known as the 
“currency carry trade” and it is argued to date back to the 80’s.  
In the currency carry trade an investor borrows in a country with a low interest rate and 
invests in another with high interest rate, gaining the carry this way. Therefore, such 
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4 
 
strategy has been presenting high returns and long-run Sharp ratios over time, despite 
recent losses. Additionally, the most puzzling question is that it is based on an 
international economics’ hypothesis known as the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) 
which states that nominal interest rate differentials between countries have a direct 
relationship with market’s expectations of exchange rates’ changes. That is, in 
accordance with the UIP a high-yield currency should depreciate by the size of the 
interest rates’ differential, thus, leading to capital losses that would fully offset the gains 
from the yield advantage. In that sense, consider for instance the most popular pair for 
the carry trade in recent years: the Japanese yen as funding currency and the Australian 
dollar as investment currency.  Let us consider that the yield in Australia was 6% higher 
than in Japan in 2007, then the AUD/JPY spot exchange was expected to depreciate 6% 
over the next year. However, empirical studies starting from 1980 have consistently 
proven this wrong as on average the subsequent currency depreciation did not 
completely offset the carry from the interest rate differential. Finally, this finding is 
known as the “forward rate bias” as a result of the rejection of the expectations theory 
hypothesis.  
Furthermore, when undergoing a currency carry trade it is preferable to analyze 
currencies exposed to a low probability of default which is a risk that an investor is 
usually not willing to take in this strategy, since the only risk he accepts to face is the 
exchange rate risk. Thus, since the returns for the strategies using the G10 countries 
remained high until the beginning of the 2008’s global financial crisis and the default 
risk is much lower than in emerging markets the general approach when studying the 
currency carry trade it is preferred to use a basket of these G10 currencies. In addition, 
most of the studies use a timespan starting after 1973 due to the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system when the major currencies began to float against each other. Hence, 
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studies have shown that by investing in this strategy an investor can obtain high average 
returns ranging from 3,96% in basic strategies to 6,6% in more complex ones, when 
considering a time range of 1976-2013.
2
 In that sense, in this Working Project it is 
intended to investigate the results of several carry trade strategies and the evolution of 
their performance. Additionally, it is commonly stated that the carry trade strategy was 
not profitable after the 2008 financial crisis or that the strategy “is not dead but 
resting”
3
. Taking this into consideration, attention is devoted to a comparison of the 
results between the pre- and post-crisis periods. 
Furthermore, after finding that UIP did not hold on average, researchers focused their 
attention on the risk factors explaining the currency carry trade returns. Nevertheless, 
returns from different carry trade strategies have hardly been explained by traditional 
risk factors, thus, leaving the currency carry trade as a puzzle. Hence, due to the long 
list of studies on these risk factors in the literature, it was preferred not to emphasize 
this aspect of the carry trade presenting merely a short analysis of the latter. 
Lately, recent studies have focused on an apparent downside of the strategy which is the 
negative skewness inducing large drawdowns. This pattern has been named as “up by 
the stairs, down by the elevator” or “picking up nickels in front of a steam roller”.
4
 
Aiming at understanding this component of the carry trade, it was decided to dedicate 
one chapter of this Working Project to the analysis of four indicators of downside risk. 
In conclusion, as these large drawdowns are related to the carry crashes, its timing is 
known to be the “jackpot question of the carry trade”.
5
 Contrary to the investigation of 
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 These are the results of both the EQ and SPD weighting strategies presented in Daniel et al. (2014) 
3
 On the 15
th
 of January of 2013, Jame Mackintosh wrote on Financial Times and article with the time: 
“Carry trade strategy not dead but resting”. 
4
 Expression used by Breedon (2001) and the economist in 2007, respectively. 
5
 Expression used by A. Ilmanen in his book “Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market 
Rewards” of 2011. 
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risk factors explaining the carry trade returns, only a few studies explore the hypothesis 
of using regime indicators to improve the returns of the strategy. Thus, the present 
Working Project’s final purpose is to find the regime indicator variables which can used 
to forecast and avoid the carry crashes and, therefore, improve the strategy’s 
profitability.  
The following text is organized as it follows: in chapter II a brief Literature Review is 
presented, while in chapter III an explanation on the construction of the carry trade 
strategies is presented. Chapter IV presents all the sources for the data used in this 
Working Project and leads to chapter V where the results of the strategies are 
commented. Successively, chapters VI and VII show the study of the traditional and the 
downside risk factors, respectively. Finally, in chapter VIII the regime indicator 
analysis is studied and in chapter IX the conclusions are displayed. 
II. Literature Review 
The studies on the failure of the interest rate parity hypothesis are agreed to have started 
in the late 70’s or more specifically in the 80’s with papers such as Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980) where the market efficiency hypothesis for exchange rates is rejected for a 
period of 50 years before the 1970’s. Also, Fama (1984) presents results where the 
reverse effect expressed by the UIP is verified. Moreover, Daniel et al. (2014) explores 
four different approaches on the rejection of the unbiasedness of forward rates. 
Nevertheless, recent literature has focused on two of these explanations: the equilibrium 
risk premium in the forecastability of the difference between forward rates and future 
spot rates (e.g. Hansen and Hodrick (1983)); and in the presence of peso problems 
which leads to powerless econometric models (e.g. Krasker (1980)). 
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Simple carry trade strategies have historically presented high average returns and 
Sharpe ratios as shown in Burnside (2012). Furthermore, more complex strategies 
determining the weights on a basket of currencies as studied in Daniel et al. (2014) 
improve the carry trade’s performance. Other common strategy is known as High-
minus-Low where the investor holds a long position in a number of high-yield 
currencies while shorting the same number of low-yield.
6
 Another way of applying the 
latter strategy is by using portfolios of currencies instead of a single currency as it was 
firstly explained in Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). 
Risk explanations to the high returns fall into many categories from traditional risk 
factors to the mentioned “peso problems”. The traditional risk factors usually include 
the Fama and French 3-factor model (1993) as it was used in Burnside (2012) and 
Daniel et al. (2014). Additionally, Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) use the 
return on the highest minus the return on the lowest interest rate currency portfolios to 
explain the cross-sectional variation in average currency excess returns from low to high 
interest rate currencies. Exchange rate volatility, likewise, seems to be one of the most 
important factors explaining the risk of carry trade strategies as it is argued that the 
global FX volatility risk captures more than 90% of the cross-sectional excess returns in 
five carry trade portfolios in Menkhoff et al. (2012). Also Christiansen, Ranaldo and 
Söderlind (2011) use FX volatility to explain carry trade abnormal returns. Moreover, 
another suggested risk indicator in the literature is consumption growth proposed in 
Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) while using a CCAPM model. More recently Jurek and Xu 
(2013) use options in the currency market to show that option-implied currency risk 
premia provide an unbiased forecast of monthly currency excess returns. 
                                                          
6
 Strategy presented in A. Ilmanen’s book and used in “Deutsche Bank G10 Currency Harvest Fund”.  
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In addition, a common global risk indicator is also popular among researchers having 
been proposed by Dahlquist and Hasseltoft (2013) who used the US bond risk premia 
and  demonstrated it to be related to international business cycles. On the other hand, 
Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) construct a slope “factor” in a model with a 
country specific and global factors which is related to changes in the global equity 
market volatility and which identifies common shocks. The equity market returns are 
also a competitive risk explanation as Campbell et al. (2010) found that many 
currencies in particular the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, and British 
pound are positively correlated with world stock markets while the euro, the Swiss 
franc, and the bilateral US-Canadian exchange rate are negatively correlated with the 
world equity market. Alternatively, Corcoran (2009) demonstrate a correlation between 
carry trades and target-country equity markets’ returns which is negative for high 
interest rate currencies and positive for low interest rate currencies.  
Finally, recent studies have focused on the “peso problems” and more specifically in the 
downside risks of the carry trade. Farhi et al. (2015) argue that the carry trade is 
exposed to rare crash states in which high interest rate currencies depreciate. Adding to 
this, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) claim that carry traders are subject to crash risk where 
exchange rate movements between high-interest-rate and low-interest-rate currencies 
are negatively skewed while pointing out that this is due to sudden unwinding of carry 
trades, which tend to occur in periods where risk appetite and funding liquidity 
decrease. Also, Gyntelberg and Schrimpf (2011) while studying short-term 
multicurrency strategies such as the carry trade demonstrate that these strategies exhibit 
substantial tail risks and that they do not perform regularly during periods of financial 
distress in global markets. Still, the authors find that there is an even greater downside 
risk in equity market investments. 
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Lastly, recent work has been developed on the hedged carry trade using exchange rate 
options. Burnside et al. (2011) shows in a clear way how to construct such portfolios, 
however, despite obtaining a positive skew it yields much lower average returns and 
Sharpe ratio. Other examples of the hedged carry trade strategy are Caballero and Doyle 
(2012) who affirm that hedge carry trades with exchange rate options present large 
return which are not explained by incurring in systemic risk; as well as, Jurek (2013) 
where by constructing crash-hedged portfolios he shows that peso problems do not 
explain carry trades’ high returns. 
III. The Carry Trade portfolios implementation 
In this section, the notation and theoretical background that is necessary to proceed to 
the empirical analysis of the carry trades will be presented. Thereafter, it is shown the 
procedures to construct the different strategies to be discussed. Let St be the level of the 
exchange rate of dollars per unit of a foreign currency, while Ft. is the forward 
exchange rate known today for the exchange of currencies one period-ahead. At the 
same time, the one-period dollar interest rate is represented by it
$ and let the one-period 
foreign currency interest rate be it
∗. 
The carry trade involves the lending of a high-interest rate currency by borrowing a 
low-interest rate currency. It follows the failure of the UIP in the sense that if the 
exchange rate between two countries does not evaluate or depreciate in order to offset 
the interest rate differential between the latter there will be an arbitrage opportunity. 
Consider below the UIP: 








Therefore, the typical studied strategy in the literature is the one where an investor takes 
a long (short) position in each currency for which the interest rate is higher (lower) than 
the interest rate in the United States. This strategy is applied when the investor borrows 
or lends in the money market and, thus, the dollar payoff to the carry trade in the 
absence of transaction costs is written as such: 




− (1 + it
$)] yt 
 where the position the investor takes in each currency (yt) is: 
yt = {
+1 if  it
∗ > it
$




Alternatively, an investor can enter in a carry trade strategy by borrowing or investing 
one dollar in the foreign currency money market. Consider that when the covered 
interest rate parity holds, if it
∗ > it
$ then Ft < St, that is, the foreign currency is at a 
discount in the forward market. On the other hand, if it
∗ < it
$ then Ft > St and, thus, the 
foreign currency is at a premium in the forward market. Therefore, it is also possible to 
develop a carry trade strategy by entering in a long (short) position in the forward 
currency’s market when the foreign currency is at a discount (premium) in comparison 
to the dollar. Finally, the dollar payoff to this strategy is as it follows: 
zt+1 = [
(St+1 − Ft) 
Ft
× (1 + it
$)] yt 
where the position the investor takes (yt) is: 
yt = {
+1 if  Ft < St








It is worth to notice that when the covered interest parity holds and without transaction 
costs, both strategies for the implementation of the carry trade are exactly equivalent. 
The former seems to have been realized until the onset of the financial crisis in August 
2007,  according to Coffey et al. (2009). Although, different liquidity conditions in the 
interest rates and forward exchange markets might dictate higher transaction costs. If 
the uncovered interest rate parity holds and the forward rates are unbiased, the carry 
trade profits should average to zero. Still, recall that the definition of the uncovered 
interest rate parity ignores that the changes in the values of currencies may be exposed 
to risk factors and, therefore, in this situation a risk premium is observed. Thus, the 
general procedure to incorporate risk aversion in arbitrage models is to examine the 
stochastic discount factor (SDF) or pricing kernels. 
3.1 Stochastic Discount Factors (SDF) and the Arbitrage Asset Pricing 
In order to confirm the fundamentals of no-arbitrage pricing it must be verified that 
there is a dollar stochastic discount factor, Mt+1, that prices the nominal USD 
denominated excess returns, Zt+1. Furthermore, since the carry trades under study are 
zero-investment strategies, the no-arbitrage condition is:  
Et(Mt+1 × Zt+1) = 0 






The analysis of the previous equation is highly important in order to study whether there 
are risk factors capable of explaining the carry trades returns and, thus, producing a 





specified. In section VI, I will present some candidate risk factors. For a longer 
explanation on the SDF methodology refer to Burnside (2012), while Menkhoff et al. 
(2012) develops an explanation on the econometric procedures to follow in the risk 
factors’ regression. 
3.2. Constructing the carry trade strategies  
In this part of this study it will be presented the five carry trade portfolios with different 
weighting strategies. Carry trades have been popular for a long time, which led 
investors to develop different strategies on how to be exposed to each currency. This 
exposition to each currency is defined by the weight that is allocated to the currency and 
the most popular is the equally weighted (EW) in that the weights are equal for every 









However, it may be that an investor wants to take more speculative positions in each 
currency at a time since the positions of the previous strategy tend to be much lower. In 
order to do it he can use one carry trade strategy suggested in Daniel et al. (2014) which 
the authors name as speed-weighting (SPW). The idea is that “the fraction of a dollar 
invested in a particular currency is determined by the interest differential divided by the 
sum of the absolute values of the interest differentials”. Therefore, this strategy 
privileges currencies with larger interest rates’ differentials while at the same time 
allowing the investment to be scaled such that there is one dollar spread across the long 


















Additionally, another common strategy comes by hedging the exchange risk on the EW 
strategy by acquiring (selling) forward exchange rate contracts on a currency when 
entering a long (short) position on that currency, accordingly. In that sense, at t+1 the 
investor is still exposed to the currency value (St+1) but now the value he holds of the 
same currency is not the investment in terms of St but in Ft. Finally, it is important to 
keep in mind that for the previous three strategies in a situation where the sum of the 
currency weights is not equal to 0, the dollar is used to made this correction. In order to 
perform such strategy I consider the same weights of EW but now the payoffs are as it 
follows: 




− (1 + it
$)] yt 
A different approach which also proved to be highly profitable is suggested by Lustig, 
Roussanov and Verdelhan (2014) and is called the “dollar care trade” since “investors 
go long all foreign currencies when the average foreign currency trades at a forward 
discount and short all foreign currencies when the average foreign currency trades is at a 
forward premium.” Then, this position is balanced by the investment in the dollar by 
investing in the US interest rate. Moreover and contrarily to the remaining strategies 
with the intention of preserving the authors’ results equation (4) is used instead of 
equation (2).  
At last, Antti Ilmanen in his book “Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting 
Market Rewards” of 2011 presents a strategy which here will name as ranking once an 
investor should weight differently his positions on each currency depending on their 
ranking. That is, the three currencies with highest interest rate differential will weight 
50%, 30% and 20% respectively, while the three currencies with the lowest will have 




for the periods when there is no data for 6 currencies the weights used were 50%, 30%, 
and their opposites. 
3.3. Final strategy payoffs using the transaction costs 
In the financial world many arbitrage strategies are known for presenting high returns, 
however, after accounting for the costs of implementing such strategies an investor 
perceives that there’s no arbitrage opportunity after all. Hence, the consideration of the 
transaction costs when analyzing the carry trades is ultimately important. However, the 
discussion is broad in the literature and it is not trivial to choose a reasonable method of 
accounting the costs an investor is facing when entering his investment’s positions.  
A popular way to account for these costs and used by Lustig, Roussanov, Verdelhan 
(2011), as well as by Menkhoff et al. (2012) and by Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) is 
to use the bid-ask spreads of the spot and forward exchange rates’ prices. Nevertheless, 
Barroso and Santa-Clara (2013) offer a different costs’ construction. This way possesses 
a problem in that it considers that the investor will be subject to the same costs when he 
rolls his position on the currencies as when he changes this position. Darvas (2009) 
offers a method that consider these differences in the transaction costs. 
Finally, Mancini et al. (2009) documented that frequent trades transact at better prices 
since they are not always executed at the posted bid or ask quotes. At last, Frazzini et al. 
(2012) when studying the trading costs of asset pricing anomalies concludes that actual 
trading costs are less than a tenth as large as previously studies suggest for many 
arbitrage strategies. 
In order to follow the literature and to obtain the most comparable results it was decided 
to follow the approach suggested by Lustig, Roussanov, Verdelhan (2011), which is 
also used in Burnside et al. (2011) just with the difference that the latter does not show 
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this construction in logarithm values. For a more formal procedure we used the values 
in logarithms, where ft corresponds to the natural logarithm of the forward exchange 
rate at time t and st+1 represents the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate at time 
t+1: 
zt+1 = (ft − st+1)wt 
When including the transaction costs, the net log currency excess return for an investor 





) × wj,t, for wj,t > 0 
Under this situation the investor either buys the foreign currency or sells the dollar 
forward for the bid price in period t, while he sells the foreign currency or buys the 
dollars at the ask price at t+1 in the spot market. Conversely, if the signal for the 





) × wj,t, for wj,t < 0 
Here the investor can either sell the foreign currency or buy the dollar forward for the 
bid price in period t, while he buys the foreign currency or sells the dollars at the ask 
price at t+1 in the spot market.  
Notice that one can easily transpose this result for the portfolios using interest rates 
since the investor when going long on an interest rate must pay the bid price, which is 
the maximum a buyer is willing to pay; while when shorting an interest rate j one 
receives the asked price, which is the minimum price a seller is willing to receive. For 
illustration, below I present the equation for when going long on a currency in the 












) − ln (1 + it
$a) wj,t, for wj,t > 0 
IV. Data 
All the data used to construct the carry trade strategies was obtained using Datastream. 
For the interest rates, exchange rates and forward exchange rates I used the 
Eurocurrency data. The analysis starts in February of 1976 but this data is not available 
for all the currencies from this moment. Due to data availability on the 1-month interest 
rates bid-ask spreads the use of each currency in the portfolios using interest rates’ 
differentials started from the beginning of the period for Canada, the Euro, Switzerland, 
UK and US; from 07/1978 for Japan; for Australia and New Zealand this period starts in 
12/1989; and, finally, for Norway and Sweden in 02/1992. However, the dollar carry 
trade as it uses the 1-month forward rates had different starting dates for each currency: 
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US are included from the beginning of 
the analysis; Japan is included from 08/1978; New Zealand from 07/1990 while 
Australia was from 01/1991 and, lastly, the Euro from its start in 01/1999.  
Furthermore, as mostly read in the literature presented before I extend the values for the 
exchange rate based in dollars using the previous data available which was of a foreign 
currency unit based in GB’s pounsd. Note that until 2007 the 1 month forward exchange 
rates used were the ones available from Thomson Reuters and similarly to the spot 
exchange rates they had to be converted from GB’s pound to US dollars. From the 
period onwards the data obtained is delivered by Barclays, unless for the Euro which 
uses Barclays’ values for its whole available period. In addition, when of constructing 
the EW-HF strategy the forward exchange rates are used to hedge the exchange rate risk 
as they become available. When using the interest rates and exchange rates I could find 




data was only obtained from its inception for strategies using forward exchange rates. It 
was decided not to include other currencies apart from the Euro (or the Deutsche mark 
from the period before its creation) due to the reasons explained in Daniel et al. (2014). 
Additionally, for the risk factor analysis the data used is explained in the due section. 
Lastly, refer to Table 1 for a description of the data used for the regime indicators’ 
analysis including the indicators used, the sources and dates. 
V. Results of the Carry Trades 
From the broad number of weighting strategies used in the carry trades it was chosen to 
analyze the results of five, which are explained in section 3.2: the equally weighted 
(EW), the speed weighting (SPW), the equally weighted hedged by the forward 
exchange rate (EW-HF), the dollar carry trade and the rankings weighting strategy. 
Refer to Table 2 for the observation of the correspondent results. 
Firstly, it is interesting to analyze how the different strategies yield so different results 
with average returns ranging from 6,90% to 3,26%, which show a similar dispersion 
when accounting for the transaction costs. with a range between 5,48% to 3,19% One 
can perceive that with and without transaction costs for the period under consideration 
the dollar carry-trade was the strategy with the best performance in terms of average 
return (6,9%) which after transaction costs decreases by 1,4%. Nevertheless, 
considering the Sharpe ratio which is usually preferred due to taking into consideration 
the systemic risk before transaction costs the EW-HF strategy would be preferable since 
it has a Sharpe ratio of 0,97 while the dollar carry trade shows one of 0,81. When 
accounting for the transaction costs the same situation persists as the former has a 
Sharpe of 0,80 while the later 0,64. 
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Additionally, it is interesting also to notice that after transaction costs the dollar carry 
trade does not show such a big gap in performance when related to the SPD since the 
latter now has simply 0,3% lower average returns (5,17%) than the dollar carry trade 
and a lower Sharpe ratio by simply 0,04 (0,60). Moreover, the rankings strategy which 
presents the second highest average returns before and after transaction costs of 5,49% 
and 5,33% shows at the same time the second lowest Shape ratios of 0,57 and 0,55, 
respectively. The last situation is due to the high volatility of the strategy since it only 
invests in a maximum of 6 currencies while from February of 1999 onwards all the 
others invest in 10, the date when the Euro is first used in the strategies using forward 
exchange rates. 
Adding to this, it is possible to observe that all the strategies with and without 
transaction costs seem to have a positive autocorrelation of one lag of 0,11 for the EW 
strategy, 0,08 for the SPW, 0,15 for the EW-HF and 0,14 for the rankings’ one unless 
for the dollar carry trade. The latter shows a negative but rather small autocorrelation of 
-0,01 both with and without transaction costs. This may suggest that these four carry 
trade strategies’ returns may be forecastable one-period-ahead which comes as utterly 
important on the last section VIII when of studying the carry trade regime indicators. 
Another interesting discussion is that of the portfolios’ profitability after the 2008 
financial crisis and for this I calculated the returns of all the strategies for the period 
after September 2008
7
. It can be observed now that the EW portfolio is no longer 
profitable even before the transaction costs with a negative average return of -0,34%. 
Also when considering the EW-HF it was no longer profitable after transaction costs for 
the post-crisis period with a negative average return of -0,25%. It is also interesting to 
                                                          
7
 I consider the start of the 2008 financial crisis as the day of the Chapter 11 filling by Lehman brothers 
on the of September of 2008. Burnside et al. (2011), for instance, extends this period by 2 moths but this 
does not change the results significantly. 
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notice how does the dollar carry trade perform much better in comparison to the other 
strategies as it gets an average return of 2,27% with a Sharpe ratio of 0,20 while the 
rankings and SPW strategies got averages returns of 1,73% and 0,83% and Sharpe ratios 
of 0,14 and 0,06, respectively, before transaction costs. In conclusion, accounting for 
the transaction costs does not lead to any change on the previous pattern of te results. 
Finally, when analyzing each strategy it is always interesting to compare it with the US 
market excess returns. In order to do this I took the previous values from Kenneth’s 
French website with monthly frequency. The statistics for the US market excess returns 
are presented in Table 2 alongside the previous statistics. When considering the entire 
period the market showed excess average returns of 6,27% which is higher than the 
returns of all other strategies but the dollar carry trade. Alternatively, the volatility of 
these returns was also almost the double of the highest volatility among strategies: 
16,88% against 9,65% of the rankings portfolio. Hence, if one considers the Sharpe 
ratios on the moment of taking an investment decision, the US market will rank last 
with a Sharpe of 0,37. Again this situation changes after the 2008’s financial crisis since 
the US average excess returns are of 9,65% and volatility is equal to 19,14% yielding a 
Sharpe ratio of 0,51 which is relatively higher than the highest of the carry trade 
strategies’ (0,2), the one of the dollar carry trade strategy. These results do in fact 
explain the wide gap between the performance of all the carry trade strategies and the 
dollar carry trade for the period after the 2008’s financial crisis since the latter has a 
much stronger dependence on the dollar and, thus, it was probably this dependence 
joined with the good performance of the US’ market which lead to its higher returns. 




5.1. Evolution of the strategies over time 
The high dispersion between the carry trade statistics alongside such a different 
performance after the financial crisis suggests they have much different dynamics. In 
order to observe this it is possible to investigate the evolution of the cumulative returns 
over time assuming an investor would have 100 dollars at risk in the strategy, which is 
presented in Graph 1. 
The first conclusion is that in the end the dollar carry trade performed much better than 
the other four strategies, which show a more similar pattern. In the beginning of the 
period we observe that their evolution is pegged, however, from 1984 until mid-1993 
the dollar carry trade feels an increased in value which the others did not. This is 
probably explained by its high dependence on the dollar which on the other strategies 
apart from the ranking’s is used just to level the investments to 0. Still, in the rankings 
strategy the maximum weight it would be exposed to the dollar is equal to 50% while 
for the dollar carry trade this value is 100%. Moreover, it is possible to state that the 
drawdowns among strategies definitely do not follow the same patters. The dollar carry 
trade strategy has much deeper drawdowns, but also one must notice that the values for 
its cumulative returns are much higher. Therefore, in order to make a correct analysis it 
should be pursued a relative drawdown analysis which will be taken in the chapter VII. 
Additionally, while the dollar carry trade has been smoothly increased in value until 
mid-2005, the other strategies have had several drawdowns without the upside trends 
felt by the former, which made them less profitable.  
On the other hand, the dollar carry trades felt a strong decrease in value from mid-2005 
until the beginning of 2008 which was not felt by its peer strategies despite for a loss in 
the rankings’ approach starting at the same time but finishing right after. In this case 
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what drove returns down was the dependence on the US’s performance. Additionally, 
from the SPW, EW-HF and rankings strategies it was the latter the one which suffered 
the most with the 2008 financial crisis since before this event it held the highest 
cumulative returns among the three and in the moment exactly after it, the previous 
portfolio ranked last.  
Finally, it is important to notice that in 2010 and 2012 the dollar carry trade strategy 
suffered sharp drawdowns that were still not recovered by the beginning of 2015. This 
result is shared by the SPW and rankings strategies due to having loss a huge share of 
their cumulative returns with a drawdown in 2012. Nevertheless, the first is currently in 
a downward trend while the second is on an upward one. As far as the EW and EW-HF 
are concerned it seems that from a graphical analysis the EW strategy never reached 
higher values than the ones of 2004 while its hedged version by 2012 had roughly 
reached the pre-crisis level but due to further drawdowns it could not achieve a higher 
level of cumulative returns.  
In order to have a complete analysis of what lead these strategies’ returns to decrease so 
sharply and to deliver a proper view on risks the strategies face, the next chapter will 
comprise a brief analysis of common risk factors used in the literature to describe the 
carry trade. Consecutively, in chapter VII, I develop a drawdown analysis of the five 
strategies and the market’s returns. 
VI. Traditional risk factors and Drawdown analysis 
In this section it will be discussed whether the average returns of the carry trade 
strategies previously described are explained by the exposure to the traditional risk 
factors or not. In opposition to many studies in the literature here it is not intended to 
search for an explanation to the carry trades’ excess return. Therefore, I will limit the 
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risk factors to two: the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model and the pure FX risk factor 
as proposed by Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011).  Finally, to model this 
exposition to the risk factors it was run a regression of the carry trade return for each 
strategy, Zt over the source of risk, Ft, as it follows: 
Zt = α + B′Ft + εt 
Furthermore, since the risk factors are explaining the returns,  the α component of the 
regression represents the abnormal return of the strategy, that is, the measure of the 
average performance of the carry trades that cannot be explained by the unconditional 
exposure to the risk factors included on the regression. 
6.1. Equity Market Risk 
In order to analyze if the returns from the carry trade strategies are explained by the 
equity market risk it was decided to use the three Fama-French (1993) equity market 
risk factors: (1) excess market return, RMRP,t, proxied by the excess return on the 
market, value-weight return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ over the 1-month treasury bill rate; (2) the Small-Minus-
Big factorRSMB,t, calculated by the average return on the three small market 
capitalization stock portfolios minus the average return on the three big portfolios; and 
(3) the High-Minus-Low factor, RHML,t, which is developed by the average return on the 
two portfolios with high book-to-market value stocks minus the average return on the 
two low book-to-market value stock portfolios. Refer to Table 5.1. in order to access the 
regression results. 
It can be seen that as it is mostly common in the literature, the 3 Fama and French 




strategy the t-statistic values of the factors coefficients’ range from |0,01| to |0,67| and, 
thus, by not rejecting that these values are statistically different from zero it cannot be 
proved that they explain the carry trade’s returns. Furthermore, the largest R2 is equal to 
0, 004. Hence, the equity risk factors do not explain the carry trade returns. 
6.2. Pure FX risk factors 
The two pure foreign exchange market risk factors used are proposed by Lustig, 
Roussanov and Verdelhan (2011) and were further used in Daniel et al. (2014) as 
explanations for carry trade risk. In their study, 35 currencies are sorted in six portfolio 
considering the interest rate differential and, after ranking those differentials, the 
currencies were organized such that the ones with the highest rankings belong to the 
same portfolio while the ones with the lowest rankings are also joined in a 
correspondent portfolio. Hence, from this construction they obtained two risk factors: 
(1) the average returns on all six currency portfolios, RFX−Mean,t; and the difference 
between the returns of the portfolios 6 and 1, RHML−FX,t. Additionally, the authors add 
that the correlation of the first principal component with FX-Mean is 0,99; while the 
correlation of the second principal component with HML-FX is 0,94. Refer to Table 
5.2. in order to access the regression results. 
Here the results obtained from the regression are far different among strategies and, 
including the transaction costs has a very weak impact in the regressions. To begin with, 
for all strategies but the dollar carry trade I obtained relatively similar results to Daniel 
et al. (2014) as they obtain a stronger statistical relation with the HML-FX component, 
with high t-statistics.  
Nevertheless, the most important result obtained from these regressions is to notice that 
it is not rejected that the constant term is equal to 0 for some of the strategies: EW and 
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rankings both with and without transaction costs, as well as, for the SPW after  
transaction costs. This suggests that the returns of these portfolios are fully driven by 
the HML-FX risk factor. Yet, this result is not surprising given that the construction of 
these strategies is similar to the carry trade strategy developed in Lustig, Roussanov, 
and Verdelhan (2014) while the SPW, EW-HF and dollar carry trade are not. The latter 
explanation is also supported in Daniel et al. (2014) while explaining the strong 
explanatory power of HML-FX factor. Adding to this, the regressions delivered 
relatively high R2 values ranging from 0,06 for the dollar carry trade to 0,71 for the 
rankings strategy. Hence, considering everything that was mentioned it is possible to 
state that strategies such as the equally-weighted and the rankings carry trade can be 
fully explained by the HML-FX factor similarly to the authors results. 
VII. Downside risk analysis 
The carry trades are known for their high returns but also for their main drawback: the 
downside risk. In fact a quick observation of the strategies’ statistics would tell us that 
all have a negative skewness of -0,37; -0,27; -0,51; -0,14 and -0,70 for the EW, the 
SPW, the EW-HF, the dollar carry trade and ranking strategies, respectively. The 
skewness of a distribution describes the asymmetry or lack of symmetry of the returns’ 
distribution around the mean and, thus, it means that if negative, the carry trade returns 
have a negative fat tail, that is, high drawdowns. At last, one should consider that for the 
same period the market’s returns had a much more negative skewness equal to -1,02 
suggesting a much higher tail risk. It is puzzling, however, how the EW-HF strategy has 
a more negative skewness than its unhedged version. In order to develop a deeper study 
on the downside risk three different indicators will be explored: the Sortino ratio, the 
drawdown and the pure drawdown. 
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7.1. The Sortino ratio 
One of the most popular measures of downside risk of an investment is the Sortino ratio 
which follows the Sharpe ratio in that the only difference is that the former uses solely 
the volatility of the negative returns, while the latter uses the volatility of the entire 
sample. Hence, the larger the Sortino ratio the lower the probability of a big loss. Refer 
to Table 7 in order to observe the results for this indicator for the five portfolios. 
Similarly to the previous Sharpe ratio analysis we observe that the market had the 
lowest value for the Sortino ratio which is explained by a higher volatility of negative 
returns which accounts for a little less than the double of the carry trade strategies since 
it is of 3,6% while the one of the rankings strategy is of 2,05%. In that sense, the EW-
HF strategy ranks first with a ratio equals to 4,62 while the dollar carry trade follows it 
with 4,53. The strategy with the lowest value for the Sortino ratio happens to be the EW 
strategy which makes now more sense than the previous analysis on the skewness, 
where the latter had a better performance than its hedged version. Alternatively, the 
market’s Sortino ratio is equal to 1,75 suggesting a much larger downside risk than the 
one of the carry trade strategies.  
Ultimately, the values for the strategies after transaction costs change in a proportional 
way since the volatility of the negative returns increases or remains unchanged for all 
strategies while the returns decrease in the same manner previously stated. Still, it is 
relevant to note that the Sortino ratio for all the carry trade strategies after transaction 
costs remained above the one of the market’s before transaction costs denoting once 
again the high exposure to large drawdowns by the markets’ returns.  
Nonetheless, as it was previously observed this picture changes drastically if we 
consider the period after the 2008’s financial crisis. The downside volatility rose for all 
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the strategies but still kept lower than the one of the market since the latter shows a 
value of 5,06% while the highest downside volatility of the carry trade strategies is 
3,50%, for the SPW strategy. However, given the poor results for the average returns 
the highest Sortino ratio among carry trade strategies as it would be predictable by the 
higher average returns is the one of the dollar carry trade equal to 0,75 and much lower 
than the one of the market: 1,92.  
To conclude the Sortino analysis it is surprising that for the post-crisis period and before 
transaction costs the rankings strategy has a higher ratio than the SPW strategy of 0,32 
against 0,24 considering its high volatility and skew. Conversely, after accounting for 
these costs the SPW strategy performs slightly better with a higher Sortino ratio of 0,19 
in comparison to 0,17 of the rankings strategy. 
Hence, this indicates that for the period after the 2008’s, the carry trade strategies are 
exposed to a higher probability of a large loss than the US market which is not true 
when considering the entire period of analysis. 
7.2. Drawdowns and Pure Drawdowns 
The Sortino ratio is a generally examined ratio for the comparison of the downside risk 
of the strategies. Although, it does not answer some of the important questions of a 
drawdown analysis such as: which strategy suffered the highest drop in value, or which 
strategy took more time to recover from a severe fall? In order to answer these questions 
it was decided to use two indicators used in Daniel et al. (2014), the drawdown and pure 
drawdown. The drawdown is a broadly used measure defined as the decline of an 
investment from its historical peak to the lowest through. This is usually measured as a 
percentage between the peak and through values. It can also be measured as the number 
of periods it took to get back to the previous peak’s value. On the other hand, the pure 
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drawdown is defined as a percentage loss from consecutive negative returns. Again one 
can measure the number of periods of successive losses. The results for the Drawdown 
analysis are presented in Table 8 and for the Pure Drawdown in Table 9. Additionally, 
refer to graphs 3 and 4 for a description of the periods when these Drawdowns and Pure 
Drawdowns occurred. 
In the mentioned tables, the results for the biggest 10 drawdowns and 10 pure 
drawdowns are shown. Once again, the market registers the highest level of downside 
risk with the drawdown of strongest magnitude reaching 49% which lasted for 40 
months as it started in October of 2007 and finished in January of 2011 which 
representing the late global financial crisis’ losses. Also interesting is to observe that the 
second biggest drawdown finished not much time before the beginning of the first since 
it was equal to 47%, started in March of 2000 with the dot com bubble and only 
finished in April of 2007, lasting for a much longer period of 86 months. As far as pure 
drawdowns are concerned the two largest for the market were equal to 34% and 33%, 
both lasting 3 months and starting in September 2009 and November 1987, respectively.  
When looking at the carry trade strategies, it is interesting to notice that the largest 
drawdown among carry trade strategies is not the one of the EW strategy equal to 24% 
which had the lowest value for the Sortino ratio, but the rankings carry trade’s one of 
36%. However, despite these two drawdowns being the strongest among the 10 biggest 
for all the strategies, the longest is in fact the one of the EW strategy lasting 110 
months, given that it started in December of 2005 and it did not finish by January of 
2015, against 68 months of the rankings strategy which started in July of 2007 and 
finished in February of 2013.   
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Additionally, it is surprising to note that the strongest pure drawdown of the rankings 
strategy is even stronger and longer than the market’s: 39% against 34% and lasting 8 
months in comparison to 3 months for the market’s strategy. Moreover considering the 
loss in dollars if both strategies were started with 100 dollars, they would feel the same 
loss of 249$ which is a utter negative sign for the rankings strategy given the difference 
on the final cumulative returns between the strategies. 
Besides, before transaction costs the strategy with the smallest drawdown with the 
maximal magnitude was the EW-HF with a drawdown of 19% which lasted 46 months 
and, thus, also the shortest. In second place ranks the dollar carry trade with a 
drawdown of 22% lasting 59 months. Both strategies felt this drawdown also in the late 
global financial crisis. As far as the second strongest drawdown is concerned the 
performance remains the same suggesting that the EW-HF and the dollar carry trade 
have both a better resistance to the downside risk. Furthermore, adding the transaction 
costs to this picture the drawdowns are stronger and  longer, however, it does not make 
any of the strategies to perform better than others at the first magnitude drawdown nor 
second. Finally, the EW strategy is less exposed to the downside risk than the SPW as 
far as drawdowns are concerned. 
When looking at the results from the pure drawdowns to the carry trade strategy it is 
surprising how now the dollar carry trade performs so much better than the EW-HF 
strategy since their both pure drawdown with the maximum magnitude lasts 5 months 
but the one of the latter accounts only for 9% compared to 17% of the EW-HF carry 
trade. In addition to this, if we consider that both strategies were initially invested 100 
dollars this continued lost would amount to 119$ for the dollar carry trade pure 
drawdown and 102$ for the EW-HF’ one. It is not surprising that the dollar carry trade 
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had still a higher loss given that it showed a much higher return for almost the entire 
period and, thus, it would still be expected that such difference in loss would be higher.  
The most unexpected part is that while this pure drawdown was felt at the same time as 
the maximum drawdown for the EW-HF strategy, the same cannot be said for the dollar 
carry trade once it finished in March of 2006 while the maximum drawdown was felt 
during the 2008’s financial crisis. Furthermore, even the second largest pure drawdown 
for the latter strategy ended in March of 1985 and the second biggest drawdown was felt 
from 11/2010 and still proceeds by 01/2015 which may indicate that there is no 
relationship between the pure drawdowns and the drawdowns. The same conclusions 
are later found in the EW-HF strategy since the period of the second biggest drawdown 
(05/1985-12/1988) does not correspond to the period of the second strongest pure 
drawdown (finishing in 02/1993).  
Among the other strategies, when looking at the pure drawdowns of the SPW and the 
EW there are no big surprises since the SPW continues to be more exposed to this form 
of downside risk with the maximum pure drawdown equal to 26% while the one of EW 
is equal to 19%. What can be odder in this situation is that both last the same number of 
periods: 6 months, suggesting that despite smaller in magnitude, the EW is exposed to 
long periods of negative returns.  
At last I explore the periods at which the biggest drawdowns and pure drawdowns 
happened so to observe if it is possible to find whether there is a relationship among 
these indicators or not as previously seen in the dollar carry trade and EW-HF 
strategies. On the one hand, in fact for all the strategies the biggest drawdown and pure 
drawdown occurred during the late financial crisis. On the other hand, the second and 
third strongest drawdowns for the SPW and rankings’ strategies were not at the same 
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time of the pure drawdown: the second biggest drawdown for the SPW strategy was 
during 07/1985 and 03/1990 while its second strongest pure drawdown finished in 
02/1993; as far as the rankings strategy is concerned the second largest drawdown was 
during the same period of the SPW’s strategy while the second largest pure drawdown 
was in 03/1993 as it lasted one more period than the former strategy. Yet, the third 
strongest drawdown was felt at different periods among the two strategies. 
In conclusion, it is possible to affirm that the carry trade strategies are exposed to strong 
and long drawdowns, as well as, pure drawdowns that are still lower than the market’s 
one. Furthermore, different indicators suggest different results for the strategies in that 
one cannot conclude which strategy is less exposed to the downside risk by using all the 
indicators at the same time. Still, the EW-HF and the dollar carry trade seem to be the 
best candidates as the carry trade strategies to be less exposed to tail risk and 
drawdowns. This analysis motivates the relevance of answering to the question initially 
asked: how can one get the timing and, therefore, hedge from these events which 
strongly drive returns down? In order to answer this question in the following chapter it 
will be developed a study on the possible regime indicators capable of informing an 
investor of the time a drawdown will occur. 
VIII. Regime Indicators 
In his book “Expected Returns: An Investor's Guide to Harvesting Market Rewards” of 
2011, Antti Ilmanen describes the problem of the carry trade as being the downside risk, 
which is proved by the analysis on the previous section. Furthermore, once we are 
studying an arbitrage strategy these drawdowns will lead to the unwind of the carry 
trade positions. As far as these unwinds have been studied, historically they are known 
for having lasted long enough to make it possible for investors to use backward-looking 
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indicators useful in the prediction of next week or next month carry trade performance. 
Therefore, carry trade returns are known for exhibiting short-term persistence similarly 
to what was suggested by their autocorrelation and, thus, a study of the rearview mirror 
indicators and stop-loss discipline is highly valuable.  
In that sense, the mentioned author presents the possibility of using some variables that 
allow one investor to avoid such losses which he names as regime indicators or 
conditioners. The variables he presents are: overcrowded carry positions, overvalued 
exchange rates from high-yield currencies, rising volatility in exchange rates, tightening 
liquidity conditions especially in low-yielding “funding currency” currencies and the 
changes in the stock markets’ returns for each currency. All the last indicators have also 
been used in other literature either by providing a signal for the carry trade positions or 
as risk factors for the carry trade returns: overcrowded carry positions and tightening 
liquidity are both used in Brunnermeier et al. (2009), overvalued exchange rates from 
high-yield currencies as part of the PPP condition is used in Barroso and Santa-Clara 
(2013), the stock market’s returns is used in Campbell et al. (2010); and, finally, the 
volatility of exchange rates is used by Bhansali (2007). Additionally, I preferred not to 
use global factors also suggested by Ilmanen and used in the literature, such as the 
return of the MSCI World by Bakshia and Panayotov (2013) or the US Consumption 
growth by Lusting and Verdelhan (2007). The motivation for this choice is that I want 
to use indicators that can be directly related with the payoffs of each currency in the 
portfolio of currencies, while usually global indicators are applied when relating the risk 
factor to the return of the portfolio of currencies. 
Consecutively, when determining to which strategy should this study be performed it 
was chosen the EW-HF strategy. This decision took into consideration four main 
factors: (1) it is one of the most well-known and used strategies; (2) it has a direct 
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exposure on the forward exchange rate, which is important when analyzing the 
relationship with the future positions’ variable; (3) by being equally-weighted, the 
positions are much more flexible to change in comparison, for instance, with the dollar 
carry trade which has a much higher dependence on the dollar’s performance; and (4) 
despite having the strongest Sharpe ratio when considering the entire period, it presents 
negative returns after the 2008’s financial crisis. 
Finally, in the next part of this chapter I describe the construction of the regime 
indicators and how they provide the stop-loss sign when taking the investment decision 
on each currency. 
8.1. The regime indicators’ variables 
To begin with, when developing the signal for the speculation on overcrowded carry 
positions I used the variable created by Brunnermeier et al. (2009): 
Overcrowded Positiont =
Fut. longt − Fut. shortt
Tot. Fut. Positionst
 
The authors use the futures position of non-commercial traders’ data from the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the intuition is that when this 
value gets too high (low) it means that the carry positions are overcrowded for the 
investing (borrowing) currency and, thus, the probability of a carry crash to happen 
increases. The authors use the forward exchange rate positions noting that many 
speculators implement the carry trade by actually borrowing and trading in the spot 
currency market.  
Moreover, when considering whether a currency is overvalued or not the analysis was 
limited for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and UK by following Ilmanen’s advice on 




the currencies that were the most used for investing purposes. The indicator used was 
the real exchange rate and, thus, we have that if the real exchange rate is higher than 1 
the currency is overvalued and, undervalued if lower. 
Analogously, the tightening liquidity conditions indicator should be used in low-
yielding “funding currencies” and, therefore, it was solely applied to Japan and 
Switzerland since they were the most used for borrowing purposes as we can also 
observe in Table 3. Here in the calculation of the liquidity conditions it was decided to 
use the TED spread applied to these countries as suggested in Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009), that is, the difference between the shortest term LIBOR rate available (3M)  and 
the risk-free rate, which is the shortest Treasury note, available for these countries. The 
intuition given by the authors is that the LIBOR rate reflects uncollateralized lending in 
the interbank market, which is subject to default risk, while the short term T-Bill rates 
can generally be considered as risk-less since they are usually guaranteed by the 
governments. Hence, when banks face liquidity problems the TED spread typically 
increases, and the T-Bill yield often falls due to a flight-to-liquidity" or flight -to-
quality".  
Finally, the stock market indices used were the country’s main index for a given 
currency and it is available for all the currencies from a certain period described in 
Table 1. Additionally, the monthly volatility of the exchange rates is also available for 
all the currencies and it was calculated taking into consideration the daily values of the 
exchange rates. 
The next part of this chapter describes the econometric models used to find the correct 




8.2. Econometric model for the threshold signaling value 
In order to use the previous indicators to provide us with the correct sign, that is, with 
the prediction of a “carry crash”, what one must find is the threshold value that makes 
those indicators to drive the carry trade returns down. The insight necessary for this 
study is that for the different regime indicators there may be two regimes: one where the 
values of these indicators have a positive relationship with the carry trade returns and 
other where such relationship is negative. As an example one can consider that there is a 
level for the Australian’s real exchange rate that makes the payoffs of the Australian’s 
component of the carry trade to be highly profitable; however, once passing this level, 
that is, when the currency gets highly overvalued or undervalued an increase of the real 
exchange rate has now a negative impact over these payoffs. 
At the moment of deciding which model to use for this application, an investigation at 
the literature on this topic did not show any promising result. This is due to the fact that 
most of the papers on the carry trade are focused on determining the risk factors 
affecting its payoffs and do not use different regimes. Nevertheless, Gubler (2014) uses 
a multivariate threshold model when analyzing the carry trades based on the USD/CHF 
and EUR/CHF currency pairs. However, here the author does not have a portfolio of 
currencies like the one of the EW-HF strategies which requires a different analysis due 
to the relationships between the currencies’ payoffs. Additionally, the author provides a 
review of the most important papers using such models. Alternatively, Jordà and Taylor 
(2012) use a nonlinear regime-dependent model in their approach but on the moment of 
determining the threshold they do it exogenously. Finally, Clarida et al. (2009) also uses 
a regime-switching model considering the exchange rate volatility as exogenous 
variable. However, the latter defined these regimes in terms of the quartiles of the 
empirical distribution of volatility over the sample period. 
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Hence, by not having a common procedure defined among the literature a different 
process was taken. This process accounts for two phases: firstly a series of VAR models 
were obtained describing the relationship among each of the regime indicators and the 
payoffs of every currency in the carry trade strategy under analysis; and secondly after 
analyzing the results from the first phase, a threshold autoregressive model is run for the 
currencies which had statistically and economically significant coefficients. 
Additionally, it is important to note that due to fast market’s changes it is only 
reasonable to consider values of the indicators lagged by one month. Also, from the 
structural definition of the VAR model, it was necessary to include two autoregressive 
components of the endogenous variables so it was decided to use the 1 and 2 months 
lagged. Refer to Appendix A for a detailed description of these models. 
Finally, it was decided to use the period from 03/1999-12/2003 for the regression since 
it is a period when all the returns are available and which allows the thresholds to be 
placed before the 2008’s financial crisis using the period when the strategies had a 
regular good performance. Hence, such timespan leaves still time for using the 
threshold during profitable years when making an out-of-sample analysis. In 
conclusion, from this two-step approach one is able to obtain the threshold values which 
give the stop-loss signal for each regime indicator for a given currency. Refer to Tables 
6.1.-6.5. to observed the results of the mentioned regressions. 
8.3. Results for the VAR and Threshold regression models 
Starting this analysis with the VAR of the future positions (Table 6.1) it seems that the 
only currency where the speculative positions and its carry trade returns have a 
statistical significant relation is the UK with a coefficient of 0,00 and a t-stat of -2,36 
and, thus, statistically significant at a confidence level of 95%. Also, it seems that a 
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small number of other relationships are found but these do not hold in fact any 
theoretical ground given that either the statistical significance or the sign of the 
coefficient do not suggest any further investigation. Therefore, it was proceeded the 
Threshold regression model just for the UK’s future positions and payoffs. The results 
for the previous regression indicate that there is no threshold value while having very 
small and not statistically significant relation between the latter since the coefficient is 
roughly equal to zero and has a t-statistic of 0,13. Hence, these regressions suggest that 
there is no threshold value for the future positions on forward exchange rate that can 
help one investor predicting future carry crashes in the EW-HF strategy for the period 
under analysis.   
Sequentially, when studying the real exchange rate indicator, I obtain from the VAR 
results (Table 6.2) that only the values for New Zealand seem to be statistically 
significant with a t-statistic of -2,23 and a coefficient of -0,02, which is the expected 
signal. Apart from this, the real exchange rates of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
UK have statistically significant impact at a 95% confidence level on other currencies 
but not on its own, which is not the expected result. In addition, some of these 
coefficients are also positive which is not the suggested by the literature and, thus, the 
threshold regression is only performed for the New Zealand dollar. Finally, when 
running this regression the coefficient not only shows a positive signal (0,01) but it is 
not statistically significant for a confidence level of 95%. Furthermore, no thresholds 
are selected for the regression, suggesting there are no statistically significant different 
regimes for this period and strategy. 
 When observing the results on the VAR of the TED Spread (Table 6.3) similar results 
are obtained given that now, however, neither Japan nor Switzerland payoffs show a 
relationship with their TED spreads. Still, it is interesting to observe that the Swiss TED 
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spread has a negative and strong statistically significant relationship with the returns 
from Australia, Canada and New Zealand. These are three of the four considered high-
yield currencies and such effect could mean that an increase in the Ted Spread in 
Switzerland reduces the liquidity of this carry trade strategy and, thus, not allowing for 
such a high investment on these currencies. These results suggest a further analysis of 
the relationship between the payoffs of these three currencies and the Swiss’ TED again 
lagged one month. Nonetheless, the results from the Threshold regression do not 
retrieve any interesting result since none of the regressions obtained a threshold value 
and despite all the coefficients have kept the negative sign, only the one of the 
Australian payoffs was statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2,40. 
Moreover, using this procedure for the market indices the time spam is limited to start 
in March of 2001 due to data on the New Zealand’s stock market. As far as the VAR 
(Table 6.4) is concerned apart from a small number of relations between different carry 
trade payoffs and market indices, the only statistically significant relationship obtained 
was again for the New Zealand’s payoffs and its market index with a coefficient equal 
to 0,08 and a t-stat of 4,09. This is the signal that is expected and, therefore, the  
Threshold regression is also produced; however it shows completely different results 
from what the VAR suggested, given that now the coefficient is negative (-0,02) but 
also not statistically significant with a t-stat of -1,03.  
Furthermore, the VAR regression (Table 6.5) for the volatility of the spot exchange 
rates does not bring any surprises from the previous results once only the volatility of 
the Swedish krone has a statistically significant relation with the Swedish carry trade 
payoffs. Although, such relationship is positive which is against the main notion that the 
volatility of the exchange rates has a negative impact on the carry trade results. Still, the 
Threshold regression was carried on and surprisingly the positive relationship persisted 
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both with a very high coefficient of 2,26 and statistical significance with a t-statistic of 
4,36 but no threshold value was obtained. In conclusion, it seems that neither the market 
indices regressions nor the volatility of the spot exchange rates can provide a threshold 
value for their regime indicators. 
To finish with this analysis, it could not be found the existence of different regimes 
among the selected variables when applied to the  EW-HF carry trade strategy and 
during the period of 03/1999 and 12/2003. The reasons may be that it is a short time 
spam and there were no strong asymmetries in the variables as in other periods. Also, 
there is the hypothesis that the high idiosyncratic risk in each currency undermines the 
statistical significance of the regime indicator variables. However, due to data 
availability and the event of the 2008’s financial crisis it would be the most relevant 
period to use. Still, it is worth to note that these results follow the insights of Ilmanen in 
the book previously mentioned as the author notices that usually these regime indicators 
are not robust. In that sense, in the next part of this chapter it was decided to use 
exogenous thresholds based on theoretical grounds and other literature review. 
8.4. Exogenous thresholds and final results  
On the moment of deciding which threshold to use for each regime indicator variable, it 
was taken into consideration the expected influence of such variable on the carry trade’s 
returns from the results in the literature motivating the use of each regime indicator.  
Firstly, for overcrowded future positions indicator it is expected that if there is a big 
change of its value there will be a “carry crash”. Hence, it was considered that if the 
percentage change in this variable in the previous period overpasses the threshold of 
100%, so that it only captures situations where positions pass from long to short or the 
opposite, the trade at that currency is stopped. Secondly, when considering the real 
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interest rate the investment on Australia, Canada, New Zealand or UK is stopped if in 
the previous period the currency was overvalued. Thirdly, the signal provided by this 
TED spread regime indicator for Japan and Switzerland assumes that when this value 
exceeds its historical mean until that moment, the borrowing in this country should be 
stopped. Fourthly, the regime indicator of the volatility of the spot exchange rates is 
applied to all the currencies in the same fashion as the one of the TED spread. Finally, 
as far as the stock market’ indices are concerned the signal suggested is that if there is a 
decrease in the stock market’s returns for a given currency in the previous period, one 
does not invest in that currency in that period.  
Similarly, instead of having only a stop-loss signal it was also applied a reverse position 
signal to all the regime indicators. Note that each of these strategies will be from now 
on named as optimized (OPT) followed by an indication of the regime indicator that 
optimized it, for example, strategy optimized by the TED spread will be named as  
OPT-TED(0) if the indicator stops the position on the currency and OPT-TED(-1) if it 
reverts the latter. Refer to Table 4.1. to observe the results for these strategies before 
accounting for the transaction costs 
To begin with it is important to notice that for the overall period all the regime 
indicators when reversing the position lowered the average returns. The same is not true 
once we look at the original idea of the regime indicators to be used as a stop-loss 
indicators since the real exchange rate, the TED spread and the volatility when used 
individually as regime indicators improve the average returns by 0,29%, 0,06% and 
0,37%, respectively. However, only the strategy using the volatility as a regime 
indicator increases the Sharpe ratio from 0,97 to 1,08. In addition to this, the most 
surprising effect from this analysis is to notice that if it is considered only the period 
after the 2008’s financial crisis all the regime indicators increase both the average 
40 
 
returns and the Sharpe ratio unless for the OPT-VOL(-1) strategy. Most interestingly is 
even to realize that after the 2008’s financial crisis the regime indicator which worked 
better was in fact the one of the equity markets index with a stop-loss discipline having 
an average return of 3,03% and Sharpe ratio of 0,29 compared with the normal strategy 
values of 0,37% and 0,05, respectively. 
The previous results motivated the analysis of joining the indicators which increased the 
average returns for the overall period, in order to see whether they perform better 
together or not. Refer to  Table 4.2. for a description of these results and to Graph 2 for 
the cumulative returns of the best performing carry trade strategy optimized by a regime 
indicators.  
Firstly, it was decided to join the TED spread with the real exchange rate (RER) regime 
indicators both with the stop-loss procedure. As it was expected the results improved 
now given that the average returns are roughly better when comparing with             
OPT-RER(0) from 5,28% to 5,30% with a small decrease of 0,02 in the Sharpe ratio 
motivated by the increase in volatility brought by the Ted Spread component. This 
effect is expected since it reduces the number of borrowing currencies. Finally when 
including the three regime indicators that increased the overall average returns, which 
will be named as OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0), the averages results highly increase to the 
value of 5,71% with a Sharpe ratio of 1,05 which compares with 4,99% and 0,97 of the 
strategy when using no regime indicators. When considering only the period after the 
late financial crisis the difference broadens even more as the former strategy has 
average returns of 1, 52% and a Sharpe ratio of 0,22 compared with 0,37% and 0,05 of 
the baseline EW-HF strategy, respectively. Lastly, when accounting for the transaction 
costs the differences are kept the same unless for the fact that now when using the 
mentioned regime indicators the strategy becomes profitable after transaction costs in 
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the period after the 2008’s crisis with an average return of 0,69% and a Sharpe ratio of 
0,09. 
In order to understand how the downside risk is affected when using regime indicators 
in the carry trade strategies I apply the analysis of the previous chapter to the          
OPT-RER&TED&VOL (0) strategy. Refer to Table 7, 8 and 9 for an observation of the 
Sortino ratio, drawdown and pure drawdown statistics, respectively; and Graphs 3 and 4 
for the evolution of the drawdowns and pure drawdowns. When comparing the 
skewness, now this strategy holds the value closest to 0 and equal to -0,08 which makes 
the EW-HF strategy which had the second lowest skewness to have now the highest. 
Furthermore, when it comes to the Sortino ratio when considering the whole period the 
same situation is kept since it was already the highest, now it simply increases from 
4,62 to 5,3. However, when considering just the period after the 2008’s crisis despite 
having largely increased by the regime indicators could not be higher than the dollar 
carry trade’s one: 0,6 against 0,75, before transaction costs. Still, it is very interesting to 
notice that considering just this period, before the EW-HF strategy ranked 4
th
 in this 
ratio, while now when using the regime indicators it has the 2
nd
 best showing a better 
performance than the SPW and rankings’ strategies. 
When analyzing the drawdown and pure drawdown indicators I also recall the large 
drops of these values indicating the positive effect that regime indicators have in the 
strategy: without the transaction costs the biggest drawdown was reduced from 19% to 
17%, continuing to be the strategy with the lowest drawdowns among those with the 
strongest magnitude. Oppositely, despite the largest pure drawdown having fell from 
17% to 12% before transaction costs it is still higher than the correspondent value of the 
dollar carry trade strategy which is equal to 9%. It is also important to note that after 
accounting for the transaction costs the values for the drawdowns and pure drawdowns 
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increased but again in a similar fashion across strategies. In conclusion, it is especially 
puzzling to notice that the strongest drawdown of the strategy optimized by the regime 
indicators was not the one of its baseline strategy which was during the financial crisis. 
In fact this drawdown was felt during 05/1985 and 01/1989 with a magnitude of 17%, 
while for the baseline strategy this drawdown was felt during roughly the same period 
but with a smaller magnitude of 10%. This situation describes one of the risks of using 
the regime indicators mentioned by Antti Ilmanen which is that despite of on average 
they increase the return of the carry trade, they can also give false alarm signs such as 
this one. 
To sum up, over the entire period only the real exchange rate, the TED spread and the 
volatility of the spot exchange rates behaved has value-increasing regime indicators 
when using a stop-loss discipline and not as reverting positions. Alternatively, after the 
2008’s financial crisis all the regime indicators, but the one using the volatility of 
exchange rates while reversing the investments, if used would have increased the value 
of the carry trade strategy. It is also interesting to notice that for the period after the 
crisis when using the indicators as reversing positions, the TED spread and 
overcrowded future positions regime indicators perform better than when using a stop-
loss discipline which is not true if considering the entire period. Although, the best 
regime indicator for this period as previously stated is the market indices returns when 
using this stop-loss discipline. 
9. Conclusions 
This Working Project provides a review on five different carry trade strategies never 
analyzed together in the literature. Similarly to Daniel et al. (2014) I conclude that the 
basic equally weighted carry trade shows the lowest average returns among strategies 
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equal to 3,26% before accounting for transaction costs. Hedging the exchange rate risk 
of this strategy by purchasing/selling forward contracts on exchange rates increases the 
profitability of the strategy to 4,99%. More complex strategies such as the speed-
weighting and rankings lead to higher average returns of 5,28% and 5,49%, 
respectively. For the considered time span of 1976-2015 the most profitable portfolio 
with corresponding average returns of 6,9% was the dollar carry trade which has a 
higher exposure to the dollar. Only the latter presents higher average returns than the 
US market, 6,27%, however, all present a higher Sharpe ratio.  
When considering transaction costs the two strategies which lose a higher portion of 
their returns are the ones using the forward exchange rate: the equally weighted hedged 
with forwards and the dollar carry trade. This result suggests that if the investor wishes 
to use forward exchange rates on his carry trade portfolio he should consider cost-
minimizing strategies. Another important remark from this Working Project is to notice 
that despite carry trades having lost their high-profit profile exhibited from the 
beginning of the 2000’s until the global financial crisis, they are still profitable after 
transaction costs. Three of the five considered strategies had positive returns with the 
dollar carry trade portfolio achieving the highest average return of 2,27%. 
As far as the risk of the carry trades are concerned I obtained similar results to the 
literature. First, for all the five strategies I find the commonly stated result that the 
Fama-French (1993) three equity market risk factors are not able to explain the carry 
trades’ returns. The second finding is also in accordance with the literature when 
considering the Pure FX risk factors presented in  Lustig, Roussanov and Verdelhan 
(2011). It was obtained that all portfolios can be explained by the HML-FX factor 
which is a carry trade return obtained from a very broad set of currencies. Additionally, 
some strategies that have a more similar construction to the portfolios presented by the 
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latter authors seem to be driven by the same risk factors: the equally-weighted and the 
rankings carry trade without and without transaction costs. 
I also do an analysis of the strategies’ downside risk and conclude that different 
measures indicate different results on which portfolio is less exposed to this source of 
risk. Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the dollar carry trade, which presented 
the highest average returns, is the strategy which had highest values for the Sortino 
ratio, as well as, lower Drawdowns and Pure Drawdowns together with the portfolio of 
equally weighted hedged with forward exchange rate contracts. Furthermore, the market 
presented the worst statistics when compared with the five currency carry trade 
portfolios. This brings new insights to the literature on whether considering investing in 
the market or in a carry trade strategy since I show that despite having large and long 
negative returns, the carry trades are still less exposed to downside risk than the market. 
Another novelty I developed is the study of the regime indicators predicting carry 
crashes and, therefore, enhancing average returns in the equally weighted strategy 
hedged by forward exchange rate contracts. Among scientific papers there is a variety of 
risk factors explaining carry trade returns and, thus, I collected five of these factors to 
use as regime indicators. Furthermore, in the literature there are few works applying 
regime indicators to the carry trades regime and there is no common econometric 
approach established. Considering a two-step process using first a Vector 
Autoregressive model with currencies and risk factors and; secondly a Threshold 
Regression model with the statistically and economically significant variables, no 
thresholds for any of the five regime indicators were found. Nevertheless, when 
defining specific thresholds for each variable as to stop the use of a currency or revert 
the position on the latter I obtained promising results.  
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Firstly, I discovered that when considering the entire period from 1976-2015 the real 
exchange rate, the TED spread and the volatility of the spot exchange rates when used 
together and with a stop-loss discipline increase the average returns from 4,99% to 
5,71%. Secondly, using these regime indicators allowed the strategy to have positive 
average returns after the 2008’s financial crisis of 0,69% compared with the -0,25% 
when not using regime indicators. Still, the latter did not allow the strategy to present 
higher average returns than the dollar carry trade portfolio, unless for the period after 
the 2008’s global financial crisis when of using the equity markets’ returns with a stop-
loss discipline as regime indicator. Using this procedure lead to an average return of 
3,03% comparing with the 2,27% of the dollar carry trade, before accounting for the 
transaction costs. 
Finally, I realized that when using regime indicators the drawdowns and pure 
drawdowns were reduced on average, however, during 05/1985 and 01/1989 the 
drawdown for the strategy increased from 10% to 16%. This result shows the main 
problem of using regime indicators which is the fact that despite on average improving 
the portfolios performance it can also induce false alarms leading to non-robust results. 
A possible explanation for this event is the choice of methodology when applying the 
thresholds. Therefore, it is recommended that further research is taken on the 
appropriate econometric models to use when of applying regime switches. It is for that 
matter advised to use a rolling-windows process due to the broad differences of the 
carry trades’ profitability over time alongside a more complex T-VAR model. In 
conclusion, it is clear that even after the instable period after the 2008’s financial crisis 
it is still possible to profit from this market inefficiency and the use of regime indicators 
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11. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Information on the Regime Indicators’ data 
Non-commercial Future Positions 
Name Source Data availability 
Australia CME 01-04-1995 
Canada CME 01-04-1995 
Euro CME 01-02-1999 
Japan CME 01-04-1995 
New Zealand CME 01-02-1999 
Swiss CME 01-04-1995 
UK CME 01-04-1995 
Real Exchange rate 
Name Source Data availability 
Australia IMF IFS 01-12-1979 
Canada IMF IFS 01-01-1979 
New Zealand IMF IFS 01-01-1979 
UK IMF IFS 01-01-1979 
TED Spread 
Name Source Data availability 
Japan 3-Month 
LIBOR 
FRED Saint Louis 01-01-1986 
Japan 3-Month T-
bill 
IMF IFS 01-01-1986 
Switzerland 3-
Month LIBOR 
FRED Saint Louis 01-01-1989 
Switzerland 3-
Month T-bill 
IMF IFS 01-01-1986 
Stock Market Indices 
Name Source Data availability 
Australia ASX 200 ASX/S&P 01-06-1992 
Canada TSX 60 S&P/TSX 01-03-1982 




DAXX30 from 02/1976 until 01/1987 and 
STOXX 50 onwards. 
Japan NIKKEI 225 NIKKEI 01-02-1976 
New Zealand NZX 
50 
NZX 01-01-2001 
Norway Oslo OBX Oslo Bors 01-02-1987 
Sweden OMX 30 Nasdaq OMX 01-02-1986 
Swiss SMI SWX SWISS 
EXCHANGE 
01-07-1988 
UK FTSE 100 FTSE 01-02-1978 




Table 2: Summary Statistics on the Carry Trade Strategies’ returns 
 The following table presents the results for the presented carry strategies for the 
period between 02/1976 and 01/1999. The availability of each currency for every 
strategy is described in the data section. 
 
Without Transaction Costs 
  
EW SPD EW-HF Dollar Rankings Market 
 
Mean 3,26% 5,28% 4,99% 6,90% 5,49% 6,27% 
 
Vol 6,20% 8,63% 5,15% 8,55% 9,65% 16,88% 
 
Kurt 1,39 1,73 1,86 0,71 1,90 3,54 
 
Skew -0,37 -0,27 -0,51 -0,14 -0,70 -1,02 
 
Autocorr. 0,11 0,08 0,15 -0,01 0,14 0,07 
 
Sharpe ratio 0,53 0,61 0,97 0,81 0,57 0,37 
 
# Months Negative returns 189 181 160 180 175 187 
 
# Months Positive returns 278 286 307 287 292 280 
 
Max Prof. 6,13% 8,99% 5,43% 8,89% 9,33% 11,75% 
 
Max Loss -6,71% -8,56% -6,18% -7,90% -12,62% -26,45% 
 
Mean 1976-2008 3,99% 6,18% 5,92% 7,83% 6,24% 5,28% 
 
Vol 1976-2008 5,79% 7,59% 4,64% 8,17% 9,03% 16,91% 
 
Sharpe ratio 1976-2008 0,69 0,81 1,28 0,96 0,69 0,31 
 
Mean 2008-2015 -0,34% 0,83% 0,37% 2,27% 1,73% 9,69% 
 
Vol. 2008-2015 8,08% 12,88% 7,25% 11,08% 12,59% 19,14% 
 
Sharpe ratio 2008-2015 -0,04 0,06 0,05 0,20 0,14 0,51 





EW SPD EW-HF Dollar Rankings 
 
 
Mean 3,19% 5,17% 4,12% 5,48% 5,33% 
 
 
Vol 6,22% 8,65% 5,15% 8,54% 9,67% 
 
 
Kurt 1,34 1,72 1,86 0,73 1,89 
 
 
Skew -0,31 -0,26 -0,51 -0,14 -0,71 
 
 
Autocorr. 0,11 0,08 0,15 -0,01 0,13 
 
 
Sharpe ratio 0,51 0,60 0,80 0,64 0,55 
 
 
Negative returns 191 183 172 193 179 
 
 
Positive returns 276 284 295 274 288 
 
 
Max Prof. 6,13% 8,99% 5,40% 8,80% 9,29% 
 
 
Max Loss -6,71% -8,57% -6,27% -7,97% -12,65% 
 
 
Mean 1976-2008 3,93% 5,97% 5,01% 6,30% 6,15% 
 
 
Vol 1976-2008 5,81% 7,27% 4,64% 7,94% 9,04% 
 
 
Sharpe ratio 1976-2008 0,68 0,82 1,08 0,79 0,68 
 
 
Mean 2008-2015 -0,44% 0,41% -0,25% 0,97% 1,22% 
 
 
Vol. 2008-2015 8,10% 12,06% 7,26% 11,08% 12,61% 
 
 





Graph 1: Cumulative Payoffs of the Carry Trade Strategies 
The following graph present the cumulative returns for the five strategies and the 
market presented in the previous table without transaction costs and following exactly 
the same specifications as above. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the payoffs per currency in the EW-HF strategy 
The following table shows a division between currencies first regarding the interest rate 
difference with the dollar and the changes on the spot interest rate and then an analysis 
over some statistics of the EW-HF carry trade strategy. 
 
AUD GBP CAD SEK SWF EUR JPY NOK NZD 
i*t-1 - it-1 1,49% 1,91% 0,78% 0,06% -2,74% -0,06% -2,65% 0,49% 1,78% 
ΔSt -0,46% -0,13% -0,15% -0,89% 3,22% -0,17% 3,07% -0,24% -0,04% 
Payoff 1,00% 1,32% 0,89% 0,60% -0,08% 0,19% 0,26% 0,32% 1,15% 
Skewness -0,44 0,23 -0,02 -0,12 -0,44 -0,09 -0,60 -0,30 -0,45 
# Mths Inv. Curr. 257 401 324 137 56 102 43 155 274 
# Mths s Borr. Curr. 45 67 139 103 412 89 394 85 28 
#Mths Inv. Curr. % 85,10% 85,68% 69,98% 57,08% 11,97% 53,40% 9,84% 64,58% 90,73% 




















Table 4.1.: Summary Statistics of the regime indicators’ Optimized Carry Trade 
strategies 
The following table presents the results for the EW-HF carry trade strategy using the 
different regime indicators specifications for the period between 02/1976 and 01/1999. 
The availability of each currency for every strategy is described in the data section 
while the availability of each regime indicator is shown in Table 1. 
 























Mean 4,99% 5,28% 5,05% 4,82% 5,36% 0,49% 4,47% 4,74% 4,86% 4,26% -0,77% 
Vol 5,15% 5,43% 5,39% 5,15% 4,95% 9,20% 4,95% 5,43% 5,13% 4,60% 6,89% 
Kurt 1,86 1,48 3,15 1,83 1,60 2,46 0,88 2,91 1,88 1,52 3,34 
Skew -0,51 -0,39 -0,60 -0,50 -0,15 -0,13 -0,03 -0,61 -0,49 -0,41 -0,07 








307 302 305 304 313 229 292 302 304 309 230 
Max Prof. 5,43% 5,43% 6,67% 5,43% 5,75% 13,38% 5,43% 6,58% 5,43% 4,95% 7,91% 
Max Loss -6,18% -5,72% -7,34% -6,18% -4,50% -10,95% -3,97% -7,03% -6,18% -4,44% -10,42% 
Mean 1976-
2008 
5,92% 6,08% 6,04% 5,81% 6,33% -0,16% 5,30% 5,61% 5,83% 5,17% -1,06% 
Vol 1976-
2008 
4,64% 5,08% 4,47% 4,51% 4,42% 8,41% 4,75% 4,55% 4,49% 4,20% 6,00% 
Sharpe ratio 
1976-2008 
1,28 1,20 1,35 1,29 1,43 -0,02 1,12 1,23 1,30 1,23 -0,18 
Mean 2008-
2015 
0,37% 1,58% 0,71% 0,58% 1,09% 3,03% 0,96% 0,87% 0,64% 0,31% 0,78% 
Vol. 2008-
2015 
7,25% 6,04% 7,69% 6,72% 6,07% 10,47% 4,98% 7,69% 6,71% 5,25% 8,89% 
Sharpe ratio 
2008-2015 





Table 4.2.: Summary Statistics of the regime indicators’ Optimized Carry Trade  
This table presents the results of the EW-HF carry trade strategy when optimized by 
more than one regime indicator on the left and the comparison between the EW-HF 
strategy and its optimized version by three regime indicators returns after accounting for 
the transaction costs. The availability of each currency for every strategy is described in 
the data section while the data for each regime indicator is shown in Table 1. 
 
Without Transaction Costs WithTransaction Costs 
 
OPT-TED&RER(0) OPT-TED&RER&VOL(0) EW-HF OPT-TED&RER&VOL(0) 
Mean 5,30% 5,71% 4,12% 4,88% 
Vol 5,57% 5,44% 5,15% 5,43% 
Kurt 2,50 2,50 1,86 2,56 
Skew - 0,50 - 0,08 - 0,51 - 0,07 
Sharpe ratio 0,95 1,05 0,80 0,90 
# Months Negative returns 165 156 172 162 
# Months Positive returns 297 300 295 294 
Max Prof. 6,67% 7,86% 5,40% 7,84% 
Max Loss - 6,82% - 5,72% -6,27% -5,77% 
Mean 1976-2008 6,24% 6,63% 5,01% 5,73% 
Vol 1976-2008 4,88% 4,78% 4,64% 4,97% 
Sharpe ratio 1976-2008 1,28 1,39 1,08 1,15 
Mean 2008-2015 1,20% 1,52% - 0,25% 0,69% 
Vol. 2008-2015 7,20% 6,96% 7,26% 7,49% 
Sharpe ratio 2008-2015 0,17 0,22 - 0,03 0,09 
Graph 2: Cumulative Payoffs of the EH-FW, Dollar carry trade and                
OPT-TED&RER&VOL (0) strategies 
The following graph present the cumulative returns for EH-FW, Dollar carry trade and 
















Table 5.1.: Carry Trade Exposure to the 3 Fama-French factors 
This table presents the results for the regression of the carry trades returns over the 3 
Fama-French factors. The sample period goes from all over the strategies period of 
implementation: 02/1976 to 01/2015. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent 



















Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
Std, Error 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [3,08] [3,00] [3,64] [3,55] [4,32] [3,57] [4,89] [3,96] [3,25] [3,15] 
MKT_RF 0,00 -0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 - 0,02 - 0,02 0,01 0,01 
Std, Error 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 
t-Statistic [0,01] [-0,01] [0,15] [0,15] [0,06] [0,04] [-0,52] [-0,53] [0,43] [0,42] 
HML 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,06 
Std, Error 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,05 0,05 
t-Statistic [0,51] [0,52] [0,57] [0,58] [0,43] [0,45] [-0,1] [-0,1] [0,12] [0,12] 
SMB - 0,01 - 0,01 - 0,02 - 0,02 - 0,02 - 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,03 
Std, Error 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05 
t-Statistic [-0,34] [-0,33] [-0,55] [-0,55] [-0,64] [-0,67] [0,25] [0,19] [0,57] [0,57] 
R-square 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,001 0,001 0,004 0,004 
 
Table 5.2.: Carry Trade Exposure to the Pure  FX risk factors 
This table presents the results for the regression of the carry trades returns over the 2 
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011). The sample period is all the data available 
for the risk factors: 11/1983 to 11/2013. Autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 



















Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,85] [0,65] [1,68] [1,46] [3,22] [2,41] [4,26] [3,55] [0,39] [0,09] 
FX Mean 0,02 0,02 0,11 0,11 0,07 0,07 0,21 0,21 - 0,04 -  0,04 
t-Statistic [0,24] [0,25] [1,23] [1,23] [1,23] [1,23] [2,18] [2,18] [-0,76] [-0,75] 
HML FX 0,34 0,34 0,50 0,50 0,28 0,28 - 0,09 - 0,09 0,81 0,81 
t-stat [9,23] [9,30] [1,16] [1,17] [8,91] [8,92] [-1,4] [-1,4] [2,45] [2,49] 





Table 6.1.: Regression results for the VAR and Threshold Model of the EW-HF 
strategy payoffs and the overcrowded future positions 
In the following tables it is presented first the VAR including the payoffs for each 
currency of the EW-HF strategy and the forward exchange rate positions lagged one 
month for the available countries as specified in the data section. Secondly, the results 
for the Threshold model regression between the UK’s payoffs for the latter strategy and 
the UK’s future positions lagged one month. Notice that despite the model includes the 
first and second lagged autoregressive value of the dependent variables, these values are 
not presented due to space limitations. Both regressions use a time sample from 
03/1999-12/2003. 
 
AUSTRA. CAN. EURO JAP. NEWZ. NOR. SWED. SWISS UK US 
Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [-0,32] [-2,04] [0,25] [0,94] [0,35] [-0,82] [-0,01] [0,84] [-0,69] [-0,16] 
Fut.Australia(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [-0,05] [0,93] [-0,95] [-0,27] [-0,71] [-0,79] [-0,70] [0,21] [-1,05] [-0,22] 
Fut.Canada(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [1,08] [0,83] [0,97] [-1,13] [0,17] [0,20] [0,00] [-0,12] [0,19] [-1,19] 
Fut.Euro(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,24] [2,40] [0,55] [-0,28] [0,39] [1,08] [1,39] [-1,33] [1,30] [-2,06] 
Fut.Japan(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,68] [1,01] [-0,58] [-0,61] [0,31] [-1,05] [-0,06] [0,76] [0,49] [-0,03] 
Fut.NewZ.(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,51] [1,89] [-0,02] [-0,78] [0,07] [1,28] [0,42] [-0,51] [0,73] [0,97] 
Fut.Switz.(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,00] [-1,47] [0,89] [1,11] [0,05] [-1,09] [0,48] [0,98] [-0,36] [0,23] 
Fut.UK(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [-0,82] [-2,84] [-1,58] [-0,69] [-0,61] [-1,73] [-2,31] [0,64] [-2,35] [0,76] 
Fut.US(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-Statistic [0,18] [-1,75] [-0,59] [-1,06] [-0,59] [-1,11] [-1,61] [-0,13] [-1,78] [-0,19] 
R-square 0,44 0,50 0,40 0,52 0,52 0,41 0,43 0,39 0,46 0,95 














Table 6.2.: Regression results for the VAR and Threshold Model of the EW-HF 
strategy payoffs and the Real exchange rate 
In the following tables it is presented first the VAR including the payoffs for each 
currency of the EW-HF strategy and the Real exchange rate (RER) lagged one month 
for Australia, canada, New Zealand and UK. Secondly, the results for the Threshold 
model regression between New Zealand’s payoffs for the latter strategy and the its RER 
lagged one month. Notice that despite the model includes the first and second lagged 
autoregressive value of the dependent variables, these values are not presented due to 
space limitations. Both regressions use a time sample from 03/1999-12/2003. 
  AUSTR. CAN. EURO JAP. NEWZ. NOR. SWED. SWISS UK US 
Alpha 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-stat [2,53] [0,97] [0,70] [0,52] [2,41] [0,61] [1,39] [0,77] [0,75] [0,16] 
RER_AUSTRALIA(-1) -0,01 -0,01 -0,01 -0,04 0,03 0,00 -0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,01 
t-stat [0,78] [1,36] [0,45] [1,86] [1,67] [0,09] [0,41] [0,20] [0,67] [1,77] 
RER_CANADA(-1) 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,05 0,01 -0,01 0,03 0,01 0,02 -0,01 
t-stat [2,58] [1,84] [0,80] [2,03] [0,41] [0,67] [1,29] [0,54] [0,96] [2,00] 
RER_NEW_ZEALAND(-1) 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 -0,02 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 
t-stat [0,07] [1,10] [0,50] [0,07] [-2,32] [0,97] [-0,60] [0,61] [0,82] [0,00] 
RER_UK(-1) 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 
t-stat [2,25] [2,07] [1,98] [0,03] [0,12] [2,49] [0,67] [0,36] [1,20] [1,27] 
R-squared 0,32 0,18 0,25 0,31 0,32 0,24 0,13 0,23 0,21 0,92 














Table 6.3.: Regression results for the VAR and Threshold Model of the EW-HF 
strategy payoffs and the Ted spread 
In the following tables it is presented first the VAR including the payoffs for each 
currency of the EW-HF strategy and the TED spread lagged one month for the Japan 
and Switzerland. Secondly, the results for the Threshold model regression between the 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand’s payoffs for the latter strategy and the TED spread 
of Switzerland lagged one month. Notice that despite the model includes the first and 
second lagged autoregressive value of the dependent variables, these values are not 
presented due to space limitations. Both regressions use a time sample from 03/1999-
12/2003. 
 
AUSTRA. CAN. EURO JAP. NEWZ. NOR. SWED. SWISS UK US 
Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-stat [3,16] [2,12] [2,02] [0,42] [3,44] [1,77] [2,83] [0,62] [0,56] [0,66] 
TEDJapan(-1) -0,45 -0,06 -0,93 -0,11 -0,56 -0,19 -0,79 -0,12 -0,73 -0,16 
t-stat [0,68] [0,13] [1,51] [0,18] [0,87] [0,27] [1,27] [0,18] [1,53] [1,09] 
TEDSwiss(-1) -1,23 -0,52 -0,25 0,42 -1,04 -0,37 -0,39 -0,16 0,07 -0,01 
t-stat [3,10] [1,99] [0,66] [1,20] [2,73] [0,86] [1,04] [0,39] [0,24] [0,14] 
R-squared 0,52 0,26 0,35 0,44 0,59 0,23 0,32 0,30 0,36 0,94 
Adj.R-squared 0,22 -0,20 -0,07 0,08 0,33 -0,26 -0,11 -0,14 -0,04 0,90 
 
 
Austr. Can. NewZ. 
TEDSwiss(-1) -0,92 -0,17 -0,65 
t-stat [2,40] [1,37] [1,23] 
Non-ThresholdVariables 
Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 
t-stat [3,02] [2,07] [2,25] 
R-squared 0,11 0,02 0,05 












Table 6.4.: Regression results for the VAR of the EW-HF strategy payoffs and the 
major stock market indices’ returns 
In the following tables it is presented first the VAR including the payoffs for each 
currency of the EW-HF strategy and the returns of each currency’s stock market index’s 
return lagged one month. Notice that despite the model includes the first and second 
lagged autoregressive value of the dependent variables, these values are not presented 
due to space limitations. Both regressions use a time sample from 03/1999-12/2003. 
 
AUSTRA. CAN. EURO JAP. NEWZ. NOR. SWED. SWISS UK 
Alpha 0,01 0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 
t-stat [3,03] [1,89] [1,26] [1,26] [9,93] [0,99] [1,64] [0,92] [0,52] 
IndexAustralia(-1) 0,09 0,05 0,11 -0,18 -0,06 -0,04 0,03 -0,09 0,01 
t-stat [0,82] [0,42] [0,78] [1,19] [1,30] [0,16] [0,18] [0,61] [0,08] 
IndexCanada(-1) -0,07 -0,02 -0,08 0,10 -0,08 -0,08 -0,06 0,07 -0,04 
t-stat [1,73] [0,52] [1,44] [1,88] [4,80] [0,96] [1,07] [1,47] [1,33] 
IndexEuro(-1) -0,05 -0,06 -0,06 0,00 -0,11 -0,11 -0,08 0,07 -0,03 
t-stat [0,77] [0,71] [0,63] [0,03] [3,81] [0,78] [0,83] [0,82] [0,49] 
IndexJapan(-1) -0,03 -0,01 -0,05 0,05 -0,04 -0,03 -0,03 0,06 -0,02 
t-stat [1,09] [0,43] [1,26] [1,47] [3,43] [0,56] [0,74] [1,79] [0,99] 
IndexNewZ.(-1) 0,00 0,00 -0,04 0,02 0,08 0,02 0,01 0,03 -0,01 
t-stat [0,02] [0,05] [0,59] [0,32] [4,09] [0,15] [0,18] [0,42] [0,17] 
IndexNorway(-1) 0,05 0,03 0,03 -0,03 0,10 0,08 0,05 -0,04 0,02 
t-stat [1,41] [0,73] [0,68] [0,62] [6,32] [1,05] [1,04] [0,80] [0,62] 
IndexSweden(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05 -0,01 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,02 
t-stat [0,02] [0,06] [0,00] [0,76] [0,71] [0,04] [0,32] [0,17] [0,54] 
IndexSwiss(-1) -0,08 -0,05 0,00 -0,06 -0,07 0,00 -0,04 -0,05 0,01 
t-stat [1,32] [0,67] [0,01] [0,72] [2,95] [0,01] [0,49] [0,61] [0,15] 
IndexUK(-1) -0,06 -0,04 0,06 0,11 -0,04 0,09 0,07 -0,10 0,08 
t-stat [0,47] [0,29] [0,38] [0,69] [0,93] [0,40] [0,46] [0,72] [0,83] 
IndexUS(-1) 0,19 0,15 0,03 -0,10 0,30 0,07 0,03 0,01 -0,05 
t-stat [1,55] [1,09] [0,16] [0,62] [6,06] [0,26] [0,20] [0,06] [0,52] 
R-squared 0,95 0,79 0,87 0,86 0,99 0,73 0,86 0,89 0,91 




Table 6.5.: Regression results for the VAR and Threshold Model of the EW-HF 
strategy payoffs and the volatility of the spot exchange rates 
In the following tables it is presented first the VAR including the payoffs for each 
currency of the EW-HF strategy and the volatility of the spot exchange rates lagged one 
month. Secondly, the results for the Threshold model regression between the Swedish 
payoffs for the latter strategy and its spot exchange rate volatility lagged one month. 
Notice that despite the model includes the first and second lagged autoregressive value 
of the dependent variables, these values are not presented due to space limitations. Both 
regressions use a time sample from 03/1999-12/2003. 
 
AUSTRA. CAN. EURO JAP. NEWZ. NOR. SWED. SWISS UK US 
Alpha 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 
t-stat [1,29] [0,99] [0,24] [0,81] [1,32] [1,04] [1,53] [3,03] [0,68] [0,31] 
Vol.AUD(-1) 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,16 -0,12 -0,32 -0,20 -0,06 -0,03 -0,06 
t-stat [0,01] [0,02] [0,05] [0,61] [0,41] [1,13] [0,89] [0,22] [0,13] [0,92] 
Vol.CAD(-1) -0,46 -0,13 -0,40 -0,13 -0,46 0,10 -0,55 0,10 -0,23 0,05 
t-stat [1,46] [0,65] [1,35] [0,42] [1,36] [0,28] [2,10] [0,34] [0,95] [0,62] 
Vol.EURO(-1) 0,75 0,27 0,23 0,14 0,44 0,43 0,34 -0,27 -0,13 -0,04 
t-stat [2,64] [1,52] [0,84] [0,51] [1,44] [1,43] [1,42] [0,98] [0,57] [0,60] 
Vol.GBP(-1) -0,03 -0,04 -0,15 0,00 -0,12 -0,14 -0,14 0,00 -0,01 0,02 
t-stat [0,31] [0,74] [1,63] [0,01] [1,15] [1,34] [1,69] [0,01] [0,07] [0,88] 
Vol.NOK(-1) 0,10 0,00 0,12 -0,18 0,18 0,62 0,18 -0,58 0,32 -0,29 
t-stat [0,73] [0,00] [0,95] [1,29] [0,12] [0,42] [0,16] [0,43] [0,29] [0,91] 
Vol.NZD(-1) -0,18 -0,08 0,15 -0,21 0,26 0,23 0,18 -0,18 0,09 0,03 
t-stat [0,79] [0,57] [0,71] [0,92] [1,05] [0,96] [0,93] [0,81] [0,50] [0,61] 
Vol.SEK(-1) 0,68 0,19 0,11 0,93 0,16 -0,28 3,11 0,19 0,16 -0,13 
t-stat [0,38] [1,71] [0,65] [0,53] [0,82] [0,15] [2,10] [1,10] [1,21] [0,31] 
Vol.SWF(-1) -0,10 -0,37 -0,29 -0,13 -0,74 -0,16 -0,54 -0,06 0,15 0,07 
t-stat [2,94] [1,73] [0,87] [0,37] [1,95] [0,44] [1,84] [0,16] [0,54] [0,87] 
Vol.YEN(-1) -0,16 -0,18 -0,28 -0,18 -0,49 0,18 -0,49 -0,32 -0,17 0,10 
t-stat [1,11] [2,03] [0,20] [0,12] [0,31] [1,16] [0,41] [2,35] [0,15] [0,30] 
R-squared 0,65 0,54 0,51 0,48 0,62 0,45 0,61 0,55 0,46 0,95 














Table 7: Sortino ratio values for relevant Carry Trade strategies 
In the following tables it is presented first Sortino ratio with and without transaction 
costs for all the five studied carry trade strategies and the OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) 











Mean 3,26% 5,28% 4,99% 6,90% 5,49% 6,27% 5,71% 
Negative Vol. 1,24% 1,71% 1,08% 1,52% 2,05% 3,58% 1,08% 
Sortino 2,62 3,08 4,62 4,53 2,69 1,75 5,30 
Mean 2008-2015 -0,34% 0,83% 0,37% 2,27% 1,10% 9,69% 1,25% 
Negative Vol .2008-
1015 
2,24% 3,50% 2,02% 3,03% 3,43% 5,06% 2,08% 













Mean 3,19% 5,17% 4,12% 5,48% 5,33% 4,88% 
 
Negative Vol. 1,24% 1,72% 1,08% 1,54% 2,05% 1,08% 
 
Sortino 2,57 3,01 3,83 3,55 2,60 4,53 
 




2,25% 3,50% 2,02% 3,03% 3,44% 2,08% 
 





Table 8: Drawdown for relevant Carry Trade strategies 
In the following tables it is presented the 10 strongest Drawdown with and without transaction costs for all the five studied carry trade strategies and 
the OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) strategy, as well as, for the market’s for the period between 02/1976 and 01/2015.  
Without Transaction Costs 
EW SPD EW Hedg. Dollar Ranking Market OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) 
Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ 
1 23,99% 110 90 1 28,86% 58 213 1 19,32% 46 128 1 22,14% 59 298 1 35,81% 68 287 1 49,39% 40 503 1 16,55% 44 38 
2 21,35% 71 39 2 18,49% 45 43 2 10,11% 39 21 2 15,27% 51 225 2 27,27% 57 63 2 47,48% 86 475 2 12,77% 24 104 
3 11,11% 38 21 3 15,51% 29 16 3 8,39% 23 9 3 9,81% 12 77 3 21,37% 43 62 3 32,21% 29 48 3 8,18% 45 77 
4 10,31% 28 11 4 14,12% 43 43 4 8,10% 17 22 4 9,46% 25 13 4 15,97% 25 16 4 28,54% 23 76 4 6,37% 9 12 
5 9,00% 17 17 5 11,53% 24 97 5 5,82% 21 39 5 9,06% 34 60 5 11,95% 30 46 5 20,75% 19 58 5 5,15% 20 5 
6 6,28% 13 10 6 9,62% 21 80 6 5,45% 15 9 6 8,65% 8 15 6 10,98% 15 21 6 18,32% 23 30 6 4,49% 11 36 
7 5,66% 7 6 7 8,55% 11 23 7 5,21% 10 13 7 7,12% 9 34 7 10,09% 13 71 7 17,27% 10 184 7 4,45% 8 39 
8 5,30% 8 7 8 8,50% 18 33 8 4,48% 14 29 8 6,56% 11 23 8 9,47% 22 78 8 16,92% 5 127 8 4,05% 8 36 
9 4,19% 18 10 9 8,09% 8 12 9 3,81% 6 5 9 6,39% 7 22 9 6,87% 12 7 9 14,08% 19 15 9 3,96% 15 17 
10 4,14% 17 11 10 7,22% 9 13 10 3,36% 8 10 10 6,02% 16 10 10 6,77% 8 11 10 13,17% 6 16 10 3,56% 7 10 
With Transaction Costs 
EW SPD EQ Hedg. Dollar Ranking OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) 
    
Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ Scl. Mag. DD #Mths Los.$ 
    
1 24,34% 110 90,4 1 29,18% 59 209,0 1 20,21% 46 101,6 1 23,52% 59 203,3 1,0 36,01% 69 280,4 1 17,07% 45 35,5 
    2 21,42% 89 40,8 2 18,64% 43 44,4 2 10,84% 43 19,8 2 17,07% 51 154,7 2,0 27,34% 57 65,7 2 13,70% 29 85,6 
    3 11,43% 42 22,3 3 15,74% 30 16,1 3 9,52% 23 9,7 3 12,73% 32 16,1 3,0 23,68% 44 70,5 3 10,50% 45 74,9 
    4 10,50% 29 10,7 4 14,61% 45 44,5 4 8,41% 21 19,6 4 11,04% 34 59,0 4,0 16,09% 26 16,5 4 6,61% 9 11,4 
    5 6,20% 13 9,9 5 11,81% 24 95,1 5 6,34% 45 31,9 5 10,45% 36 50,0 5,0 12,08% 30 45,5 5 6,17% 35 6,2 
    6 5,54% 7 6,1 6 9,74% 21 78,3 6 5,78% 18 9,1 6 9,37% 26 14,0 6,0 10,83% 15 21,6 6 4,86% 13 30,1 
    7 4,93% 7 6,9 7 8,81% 11 24,8 7 5,50% 11 12,0 7 7,72% 10 28,0 7,0 10,20% 22 80,3 7 4,63% 8 30,7 
    8 4,25% 18 10,0 8 8,55% 18 32,6 8 4,84% 16 24,1 8 7,22% 12 20,3 8,0 10,14% 13 69,1 8 4,38% 16 15,1 
    9 4,20% 17 11,1 9 7,68% 8 11,5 9 3,89% 7 4,4 9 6,82% 7 18,6 9,0 6,93% 12 7,0 9 4,16% 8 28,2 
    10 3,30% 12 3,3 10 7,14% 9 12,7 10 3,63% 17 12,4 10 5,52% 4 7,4 10,0 6,36% 6 7,7 10 3,90% 8 9,8 
    
62 
 
Table 9: Pure Drawdown for relevant Carry Trade strategies 
In the following tables it is presented the 10 strongest Pure Drawdown with and without transaction costs for all the five studied carry trade strategies 
and the OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) strategy, as well as, for the market’s for the period between 02/1976 and 01/2015. 
Without Transaction Costs 
EW SPD EQ Hedg. Dollar Ranking Market OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) 
Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ 
1 19,41% 6 63,2 1 25,53% 6 160,9 1 16,97% 5 101,6 1 9,45% 5 119,9 1 39,47% 8 248,8 1 34,33% 3 249,1 1 12,18% 5 92,4 
2 12,35% 6 21,0 2 15,23% 5 42,6 2 8,45% 5 22,2 2 9,04% 5 15,4 2 19,41% 6 51,0 2 33,60% 3 75,7 2 6,58% 2 11,9 
3 11,78% 5 21,4 3 11,44% 6 24,9 3 6,85% 6 13,4 3 8,90% 2 99,4 3 18,98% 6 38,7 3 21,97% 4 142,4 3 5,72% 1 12,2 
4 7,92% 4 12,5 4 10,99% 4 10,7 4 6,07% 4 6,1 4 8,73% 2 11,2 4 12,98% 4 23,9 4 21,17% 5 51,8 4 5,56% 2 50,0 
5 7,53% 4 7,4 5 10,87% 6 85,1 5 5,61% 3 9,4 5 8,58% 4 121,1 5 12,78% 3 31,0 5 19,78% 4 139,9 5 5,34% 3 12,0 
6 6,97% 2 12,5 6 9,57% 2 76,0 6 5,24% 4 9,9 6 8,46% 2 117,2 6 11,77% 2 80,4 6 18,96% 5 183,7 6 4,77% 2 34,7 
7 6,75% 3 10,2 7 9,52% 3 18,8 7 5,16% 2 31,4 7 8,44% 5 110,0 7 11,63% 3 21,3 7 18,93% 3 169,6 7 4,62% 4 9,3 
8 6,48% 2 9,8 8 9,05% 2 49,7 8 5,08% 3 33,2 8 8,36% 2 93,1 8 10,30% 4 10,0 8 18,54% 2 126,7 8 4,57% 2 42,0 
9 5,81% 2 6,2 9 8,88% 3 33,0 9 4,48% 2 24,5 9 7,90% 1 95,8 9 9,73% 5 76,5 9 18,22% 2 103,1 9 4,54% 4 9,0 
10 5,78% 2 19,1 10 8,86% 3 69,8 10 4,48% 2 29,4 10 7,42% 4 56,4 10 8,55% 3 15,0 10 18,10% 4 22,8 10 4,00% 3 31,1 
With Transaction Costs 
EW SPD EQ Hedg. Dollar Ranking OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) 
    
Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ Scl. Mag. PD #Mths. Los.$ 
    
1 19,52% 6 62,4 1 25,64% 6 156,5 1 17,29% 5 78,1 1 9,81% 5 79,7 1 39,68% 8 242,7 1 12,45% 5 71,9 
    2 12,36% 6 21,7 2 15,79% 5 44,5 2 9,20% 7 8,9 2 9,60% 2 11,6 2 20,43% 6 55,0 2 6,84% 2 11,4 
    3 12,13% 5 22,3 3 11,42% 6 25,7 3 8,79% 5 19,6 3 9,57% 5 13,6 3 18,94% 6 40,2 3 5,77% 1 11,0 
    4 7,93% 4 13,0 4 11,01% 4 10,6 4 7,23% 6 12,7 4 9,05% 2 63,1 4 16,85% 7 15,7 4 5,56% 2 37,7 
    5 7,58% 4 7,4 5 10,96% 6 82,2 5 5,96% 3 9,1 5 8,85% 4 76,8 5 12,95% 4 24,8 5 5,43% 3 11,0 
    6 7,11% 2 13,1 6 9,60% 3 19,5 6 5,43% 4 9,1 6 8,79% 5 70,2 6 12,79% 3 31,0 6 4,84% 2 26,8 
    7 6,82% 3 10,6 7 9,58% 2 73,3 7 5,22% 2 23,8 7 8,60% 2 72,3 7 11,81% 2 78,0 7 4,84% 4 8,8 
    8 6,40% 2 9,9 8 9,08% 2 48,2 8 5,19% 3 25,2 8 8,51% 2 59,4 8 11,46% 3 21,6 8 4,72% 4 8,3 
    9 5,74% 2 18,6 9 8,94% 3 32,6 9 4,58% 2 18,8 9 7,97% 1 60,2 9 10,21% 5 76,4 9 4,55% 1 31,6 
    10 5,72% 3 19,8 10 8,91% 3 67,6 10 4,57% 2 22,3 10 7,90% 4 40,3 10 8,64% 3 15,8 10 4,19% 3 25,2 
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Graph 3: Drawdown for relevant Carry Trade strategies 
In the following graphs it is presented the Drawdowns without transaction costs for all 
the five studied carry trade strategies and the OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) strategy, as 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Drawdown OPT-RER&TED&VOL (0) 
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Graph 4: Pure Drawdown for relevant Carry Trade strategies 
In the following graphs it is presented the Pure Drawdowns without transaction costs for 
all the five studied carry trade strategies and the OPT-RER&TED&VOL(0) strategy, as 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The vector autoregressive model used was of order two due to the system’s 
requirements, denoted as VAR (2), is as follows: 
𝑦𝑡,𝑗 = 𝛼1,𝑗𝑦𝑡−1,𝑗 + 𝛼2,𝑗𝑦𝑡−2,𝑗 + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑡−1,𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑦𝑡is a j vector of endogenous variables, 𝑥𝑡−1 a is k vector of exogenous 
variables, 𝛼1, 𝛼2 and 𝛽 are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑡 is a vector of 
innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated among themselves but 
uncorrelated with their own lagged values and also uncorrelated with all of the right-
hand side variables. Therefore, in this Working Project 𝑦𝑡,𝑗 represents the carry trade 
return at period t for the currency j, while 𝑥𝑡−1,𝑘 represents the regime indicator k at the 
period t-1. Vector autoregressive models (VAR) were advocated in Sims (1980). 
Threshold Regression Model 
On the other hand, the threshold regression model used is as it follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = {
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑡−1 > 𝛾
𝛼 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡𝑖𝑓 𝑥𝑡−1 ≤ 𝛾
 
Where 𝑦𝑡 is the endogenous variable, 𝑥𝑡−1 is the exogenous variable lagged one period, 
𝛽𝑛 is the coefficient to be estimated under regime n, 𝜀𝑡 is the error value of the 
regression, and 𝛾 is the threshold value to be estimated. 
For further explanations on threshold models one can consider Hansen (2000). 
Furthermore, the author acknowledges the use of threshold models by the development 
of the Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model of Tong (1983, 1990). 
(18) 
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